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CONSULTATION OR CONSENT:
THE UNITED STATES’ DUTY TO CONFER WITH AMERICAN
INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
ROBERT J. MILLER *

ABSTRACT
This article explores the current international law movement to require
nations/states to consult with Indigenous peoples before undertaking actions
that impact Indigenous nations and communities. The United Nations took
a significant step in this area of law in September 2007 when the General
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The Declaration contains many provisions requiring states to confer and
consult with Indigenous peoples, and in many instances, to obtain their
“free, prior, and informed consent.” This article undertakes an original and
detailed investigation into how the free, prior, and informed consent
standard emerged in the drafting of the Declaration.
But this article also points out that consultations and obtaining the
consent of Indigenous peoples is nothing new in the political and diplomatic
relations between American Indian nations and the United States. From the
very founding of the United States, it has maintained a government-togovernment relationship with Indian tribes. This is expressly recognized in
the U.S. Constitution and is reflected in hundreds of U.S./Indian treaties and
in the history of the interactions between these governments. A nearly
constant stream of formal and informal consultations and diplomatic
dealings has marked this relationship.
In recent decades, though, the international community has begun
focusing on consultations with Indigenous peoples and has increased the
international law obligation on states to consult. The international regime is
also moving far beyond mere consultations and is requiring states to obtain
the free, prior, and informed consent of Indigenous peoples. On the
surface, requiring the United States to obtain the informed consent of Indian
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and Ammon Orr for their research assistance; and profound thanks go to Dr. Rosalee Gonzalez
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nations and peoples, before undertaking actions that affect them, might be
more onerous than just consulting with tribal governments.
This article examines the history and modern-day processes for United
States consultations with Indian nations and the emerging international law
standard of free, prior, and informed consent. The article argues that the
United States should continue and even enhance the consent paradigm that
has always been the goal of federal/tribal relations. And, the article also
argues that the United States should have little trouble adapting to the new
international law consent movement.
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INTRODUCTION

The political existence of the American Indian nations and their
government-to-government relationship with the United States is expressly
recognized in the U.S. Constitution.1 The long history of the interactions
between these governments is marked by diplomatic efforts to resolve
disputes and address common interests.2 A nearly constant stream of
formal and informal consultations and diplomatic dealings has marked this
relationship. Tribal governments and Indian peoples are very interested in
seeing this mutually respectful relationship continue and even be enhanced
and improved in the future.
In recent decades, the international community has demonstrated oneway consultations between the federal government and tribal governments
could be changed and perhaps improved. The international law regime is
moving beyond mere consultations with indigenous peoples to what is
known as “free, prior and informed consent.”3 On the surface, requiring the
United States to obtain the informed consent of Indian nations and peoples,
before undertaking actions that affect Indians, is far more complicated, and
perhaps onerous, than just consulting with tribal governments and Indians.
In lieu of those potential difficulties, the United States to date has only seen
fit to attempt to improve its consultation processes and has mostly ignored
the emerging free, prior, and informed consent paradigm.
This article examines the history and modern-day processes for United
States consultations with Indian nations and the emerging international law
standard of free, prior, and informed consent (“FPIC”). This article argues
that the United States should continue and even enhance the consent
requirement that has been the goal of federal/tribal relations since the birth
of the United States. Overall, the United States should have little trouble
absorbing and adapting to the new international consent legal movement.
Mere consultation with American Indian nations, without obtaining
consent, does not fulfill the United States’ legal duties to Indian nations, nor
does it honor the history of the United States’ diplomatic relationship with
tribal governments or the emerging FPIC standard.
1. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. VI, cl. 2; amend. 14, § 2.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 19 (Sept. 13, 20007) (“States shall consult and cooperate
in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions
in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing
legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.”).
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Part II lays out the history of consultation and consent between
American Indian governments and the United States and the modern-day
legal basis for a federal duty to consult. Part III then dissects the current
efforts by the United States to implement and improve its consultation
processes with Indian nations. Part IV examines the recent development in
international law of the standard of FPIC, which moves significantly
beyond mere consultations. This Part undertakes an original and detailed
investigation into how FPIC emerged into international law through the
process of drafting the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples. Finally, Part V concludes with the author’s opinions on the future
of U.S./Indian consultation policies and how they should conform to the
FPIC standard.
II. THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FEDERAL CONSULTATIONS
WITH TRIBAL NATIONS
Long before Europeans began colonizing North America, indigenous
peoples and Indian nations governed themselves through various
governmental entities. These entitles ranged from informal structures for
quasi-family bands of nomadic hunter/gatherers to very complex and even
hierarchical and authoritarian governments for large and settled
populations. For example, Indian nations in the Mississippi Valley, the
Adena and Hopewell cultures from 1000 BCE to 500 CE in what is now
modern-day Ohio, and the Ancestral Puebloans in the American Southwest
governed themselves through political entities that possessed the power to
mobilize labor and manufacture, to build roads and cities that included
urban areas and populations, to build enormous residential and ceremonial
structures, and to practice elaborate burials of elite leaders.4 The city of
Cahokia, near modern day St. Louis,5 existed from 900–1400 CE and had
an estimated population at its highpoint of 15,000–38,000.6 The earthen
4. ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN
COUNTRY 13, 19-20 (2012) [hereinafter MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”] (citing 2,000
year old irrigation canal systems near modern-day Phoenix); CHARLES C. MANN, 1491: NEW
REVELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS BEFORE COLUMBUS 41-42, 288-90 (2005); Neal Salisbury, The
Indians’ Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans, in AMERICAN
ENCOUNTERS: NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS FROM EUROPEAN CONTACT TO INDIAN REMOVAL
1500-1850, at 5, 7-10 (Peter C. Mancall & James H. Merrell eds., 2000); MICHELE STRUTIN,
CHACO: A CULTURAL LEGACY 34-35, 50-51 (1994); LYNDA NORENE SHAFFER, NATIVE
AMERICANS BEFORE 1492: THE MOUNDBUILDING CENTERS OF THE EASTERN WOODLANDS 3,
20-28, 33-38, 40-45 (Kevin Reilly ed., 1992); Stephen H. Lekson, The Chaco Canyon Community,
SCI. AM., July 1988, at 108; FOOD, FIBER, AND THE ARID LANDS 58 (William G. McGinnies et al
eds., 1971).
5. SHAFFER, supra note 4, at 51.
6. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FRONTIER: ECONOMIC EXPLORATIONS INTO NATIVE AMERICAN
HISTORY 87 (Linda Barrington ed., 1999); SHAFFER, supra note 4, at 53.
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ceremonial mound that the Cahokians built is the world’s largest
earthwork.7 Moreover, French accounts of the Natchez culture in the lower
Mississippi region demonstrate it was ruled by a royal lineage and leading
citizens were carried in litters.8 Some tribal governments also taxed their
citizens and held public monies and crops in public treasuries.9
Most Indian nations interacted politically with other tribes and many
created tribal confederations for mutual protection and other benefits.10 For
example, the Hadenosaunee or Iroquois Confederacy was a federalist
governing system devised by the Five, and later Six, Nations (Oneida,
Onondaga, Seneca, Mohawk, Cayuga, and Tuscarora) in what is now
upstate New York to control their intra-tribal and international relations.11
They met in an annual congress to decide internal and international legal
and political issues.12 Many other Indian governments also developed
sophisticated regimes, including democratic and governance principles,
such as the separation of powers between branches of government and

7. SHAFFER, supra note 4, at 51.
8. Id. at 62-67.
9. 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS (NORTHEAST) 384 (William C. Sturtevant
et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS] (explaining that
some clans and villages established a “public treasury” to which everyone contributed and was
administered by a chief for public purposes); ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE
UNITED STATES 13-14 (1970) (noting public storehouses controlled by town chiefs in the Creek
and Cherokee Tribes were for public needs).
10. See generally DUANE CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL ORDER AND POLITICAL CHANGE:
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS AMONG THE CHEROKEE, THE CHOCTAW, THE CHICKASAW,
AND THE CREEK (1992); COLIN G. CALLOWAY, CROWN AND CALUMET: BRITISH-INDIAN
RELATIONS, 1783-1815, at 14, 32, 45, 55 (1987) (mentioning Creek, Chickasaw, Choctaw,
Cherokee, Miami, Shawnee, and Delaware created powerful, multi-tribal confederacies); VINE
DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 85-86 (1983);
DOROTHY V. JONES, LICENSE FOR EMPIRE: COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN EARLY AMERICA 34-35
(1982).
11. BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN INDIAN HELPED
SHAPE DEMOCRACY 8-10 (1982); 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 9, at
314-17, 418-33; DONALD A. GRINDE, JR., THE IROQUOIS AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN
NATION 62-80 (1977); Frank Gouldsmith Speck, THE IROQUOIS: A STUDY IN CULTURAL
EVOLUTION 23 (1st ed. 1945); JONES, supra note 10, at 21; OLIVER MORTON DICKERSON,
AMERICAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT 1696-1765, at 336 (1912) (the confederacy held the balance
of power for several centuries in North America); see generally LEWIS H. MORGAN, ANCIENT
SOCIETY (1877). The Confederacy dates from at least the fifteenth century and was fully
developed when the French encountered it in 1630. JONES, supra note 10, at 23; FRANCIS
JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE: THE COVENANT CHAIN CONFEDERATION OF
INDIAN TRIBES WITH ENGLISH COLONIES FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE LANCASTER TREATY OF
1744, at 39 (1984) (Iroquois League was formed between 1400–1600 CE); 15 HANDBOOK OF
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 9, at 418. Others argue it was fully formed by the twelfth
century. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, PENNSYLVANIA, AND THE FIRST NATIONS: THE TREATIES OF
1736–62, at 6 (Susan Kalter ed., 2006).
12. 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 9, at 420, 433.
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between civil and military powers.13 In many of these tribal governing
systems, female leaders exercised important powers.14 Tribal governments
often engaged in negotiations with other Indian nations regarding
diplomatic affairs and trade, and many entered into agreements like
treaties.15
Negotiating, entering agreements, and engaging in diplomacy with
other governments was a regular practice of American Indian nations. It is
not surprising, then, that all of the European countries that attempted
colonization in North America dealt with the Indigenous nations as political
entities that possessed sovereign governing powers.16 England and the
English colonies, for example, signed scores of treaties with tribes on the
east coast of North America, engaged in extensive diplomatic relations with
Indians, and in England, the Crown even received diplomatic visits from
North American tribal representatives.17 Spain signed up to twenty treaties
with Indian nations, across what are now the southeast and southwest areas
of the United States.18 France and Holland also engaged in diplomatic
relations with Indigenous peoples and entered treaties with Indian nations to
buy land, to engage in trade, and to ensure peace.19 These arrangements
13. Id. at 156, 216, 261, 314-17, 418-41, 610, 627, 640, 684, 782; Robert J. Miller, American
Indian Influence on the United States Constitution and Its Framers, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133,
143-46 (1993) [hereinafter Miller, American Indian Influence]; RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND
THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 24 (1975); ANGIE DEBO, THE ROAD TO
DISAPPEARANCE: A HISTORY OF THE CREEK INDIANS 6 (1941).
14. Miller, American Indian Influence, supra note 13, at 144-45; Renee Jacobs,
Note, Iroquois Great Law of Peace and the United States Constitution: How the Founding
Fathers Ignored the Clan Mothers, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 497 (1991); 15 HANDBOOK OF
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 9, at 216, 261, 617-18, 627, 684, 782.
15. See, e.g., 1 VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775-1979, at 6-8, 681-744
(1999).
16. JONES, supra note 10, at 84-85 (“Long before 1765, observers were recording welldefined territorial limits for the various Indian groups north of the Ohio and east of the
Mississippi. Associated with these limits were clear and commonly accepted ideas of trespass, as
well as of permissive use by outsiders.”).
17. JEFFREY GLOVER, PAPER SOVEREIGNS: ANGLO-NATIVE TREATIES AND THE LAW OF
NATIONS, 1604-1664, at 15, 29, 59, 91, 99, 133, 188 (2014); FRANKLIN, supra note 11, at 11-14,
35, 160, 185, 226, 308, 358, 369; 4 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS (HISTORY OF
INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS) 128-43, 185-94, 211-29 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1988);
CALLOWAY, supra note 10, at 66; JENNINGS, supra note 11, at 156, 236, 241, 259; see generally
HENRY F. DE PUY, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE ENGLISH COLONIAL TREATIES WITH THE AMERICAN
INDIANS: INCLUDING A SYNOPSIS OF EACH TREATY (Martino Pub. 1999) (1917).
18. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL
ANOMALY 59 (1994) [hereinafter PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES]; 1 DELORIA &
DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 6, 103, 106-07.
19. 1 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 6; ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA,
DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS & CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY
22 (2006) [hereinafter MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA] (noting the Dutch colonies entered treaties and
transacted with the Indian Nations); JENNINGS, supra note 11, at 53-54 (Dutch treaty with the
Mohawks in 1643).
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were based, needless to say, on extensive and prior consultations and
consent by both parties before the agreements were considered binding.20
The English colonies that developed on the east coast of the presentday United States signed dozens, if not hundreds, of treaties with Indian
tribes regarding land, trade, jurisdiction, and peace.21 In addition, most of
the colonies were involved in nearly continuous diplomatic interactions and
negotiations with Indian nations.22 The records of the diplomatic sessions
and treaties that Benjamin Franklin published regarding just the colony of
Pennsylvania, and only for the years 1736–1762, exemplify the broad
extent of these colonial diplomatic activities with Indian nations.23
Obviously, the treaty agreements that resulted from these efforts were
preceded by lengthy consultation sessions and were based on the mutual
consent of the parties.
A. THE UNITED STATES AND INDIAN NATIONS CONSENSUAL TREATY
RELATIONS 1774–1871
In September 1774, the thirteen English/American colonies created
their first national government, the loosely organized Continental Congress.
It is not surprising that this government continued the English, European,
and colonial practice of dealing with Indian nations as sovereign
governments via diplomatic, political, and treaty-making processes.24 From
its very beginning, the United States government realized it had to deal with
the tribal nations to ensure its survival and success.25 Thus, the United
States took a very conciliatory and respectful position vis-à-vis Indian
tribes. For example, in the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress
continually pleaded with tribal governments to stay neutral or to join the

20. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 10, at 3.
21. See generally EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789
(Alden T. Vaughan ed., 1979–2003) (consisting of 20 volumes); PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN
TREATIES, supra note 18, at 21; DE PUY, supra note 17; JONES, supra note 10, at 14, 26-30, 53,
70, 75, 89.
22. See, e.g., Miller, American Indian Influence, supra note 13, at 135-36; JONES, supra note
10, at 89; see generally FRANKLIN, supra note 11.
23. See generally FRANKLIN, supra note 11; JONES, supra note 10, at 58-59.
24. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 18, at 21, 23.
25. Dickerson, supra note 11, at 336; XVIII EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS:
TREATIES AND LAW, supra note 21, at 1-3, 39, 43, 59-60, 63-65, 68-71, 84-85, 98-114, 124;
Miller, American Indian Influence, supra note 13, at 137-39; THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON: COLONIAL SERIES VOL. 4, NOVEMBER 1756–OCTOBER 1757, 192-94 (W.W.
Abbot ed., 1988); JOHANSEN, supra note 11, at 65 (quoting Benjamin Franklin); FRANCIS
JENNINGS, EMPIRE OF FORTUNE: CROWNS, COLONIES, AND TRIBES IN THE SEVEN YEARS WAR IN
AMERICA 88 (1988); PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798, at 67-68
(1956); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 549 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1,
34 (1831) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
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U.S. side.26 In addition, in 1778 this Congress requested permission before
crossing Delaware Nation territory to attack the British. This treaty with
the Delaware even offered them the opportunity to join the Union as a
state.27
The thirteen American states then convened a new Congress in 1781
under a written constitution called the Articles of Confederation. This
Congress was granted “the sole and exclusive right and power of . . .
regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians.”28 This
Congress took steps to exclude the states from Indian affairs and continued
the colonial and Continental Congress practice of negotiating with tribal
governments over trade, peace, and land purchases, and it ultimately
entered at least eight treaties with Indian nations from 1784–1789.29
In 1789, the United States began operating under our current
Constitution. Article I grants Congress the sole authority to deal with Indian
tribes.30 This Constitution also includes a treaty clause, which ratified the
previous nine treaties the Continental and Articles of Confederation
Congresses had entered with tribal nations, authorized future federal/tribal
treaty making, and made treaties “the supreme Law of the Land.”31
Indian tribes were very important to the existence and development of
the nascent United States.32 Indian nations were powerful, numerous, and
26. XVIII EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAW, supra note 21, at 12; GRINDE, supra note 11, at 62-80; PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 18, at 23;
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 35-36, 39-42 (1995 ed.) [hereinafter PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER].
27. Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13 art. 6, reprinted in 2 INDIAN
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 3-5 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904) [hereinafter INDIAN AFFAIRS].
28. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX (1781); but see Miller, American Indian
Influence, supra note 13, at 151-52 (“[T]he Articles of Confederation proved inadequate in
maintaining uniformity among the states and creating a federal Indian policy.”)
29. Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS,
supra note 27, at 5-6; Treaty with the Wyandot, Etc., Jan. 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16, reprinted in id. at
6-8; Treaty with the Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, reprinted in id. at 8-11; Treaty with the
Choctaw, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21, reprinted in id. at 11-14; Treaty with the Chickasaw, Jan. 10,
1786, 7 Stat. 24, reprinted in id. at 14-16; Treaty with the Shawnee, Jan. 31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26,
reprinted in id. at 16-18; Treaty with the Wyandot, Etc., Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 28, reprinted in id. at
18-23; Treaty with the Six Nations, Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 33, reprinted in id. at 23-25; cf. 1
DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 15 (arguing that the Confederation Congress entered
into at least eleven treaties with tribes from 1783–1789); see also MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA,
supra note 19, at 39-43.
30. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Robert J. Miller, American Indians and the United States
Constitution (2000), at 5, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1573144 (last
visited August 5, 2015); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 277 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al eds., 2012 ed.) [hereinafter COHEN’S].
32. “Most American history has been written as if history were a function solely of white
culture - in spite of the fact that till well into the nineteenth century the Indians were one of the
principal determinants of historical events.” A. Irving Hallowell, The Backwash of the Frontier:
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located within, and on, the borders of the United States. The United States
was heavily involved in Indian affairs, diplomacy, and treaty making in its
early decades.33 And President George Washington quickly established
many of the Indian treaty procedures that came into practice. He showed
great respect for Indian treaties and handled them in the same fashion as he
did international treaties.34
Ultimately, the United States entered 366 (or more) treaties with Indian
nations from 1789–1871.35 These treaties were entered after extensive
negotiations and consultations and only with the consent of the tribal
governments. The Senate would sometimes reject treaties agreed to by
tribes and the Executive Branch, and vice versa, tribal nations rejected
treaties proposed by federal officials; occasionally, the Senate referred
treaties back to a tribal government to consider changes the Senate insisted
upon.36 Some of the treaties contained provisions that any future
amendments required the consent of the tribe; often the requirement was
that three-quarters of the adult males of the tribe had to consent.37
Obviously, these treaties required intelligent negotiation and mutual consent
by both parties.38 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has
analogized Indian treaties to international treaties and called them
“contracts between nations.”39

The Impact of the Indian on American Culture, in THE FRONTIER IN PERSPECTIVE 230 (Walker D.
Wyman & Clifton B. Kroeber eds., 1957) (quoting Bernard DeVoto).
33. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 18, at 2-4 (stating that from the
beginning, the U.S. recognized the autonomy of Indian tribes and that treaties rested on the
concept of Indian sovereignty).
34. Id. at 67, 72-73.
35. KAPPLER REVISITED: AN INDEX AND BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO AMERICAN INDIAN
TREATIES 7 (Charles D. Bernholz ed., 2003); PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, supra note
18, at 446-502. See also 1 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 3-5 (arguing that hundreds of
other agreements qualify as Indian treaties).
36. See, e.g., 2 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 745-1083. Cf. 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS,
supra note 27, at 145, 162 (Treaty with the Wyandot, Etc., 1817, art. 6, 7 Stat. 160 and Treaty
with the Wyandot, Etc., 1818, art. 1, 7 Stat. 178).
37. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 69 (1999); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980);
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
38. Indian treaties involved real negotiations and consent situations: “[T]he stereotype of
Indian leaders at treaty talks as being passive and overmatched intellectually is wrong. . . . The
calculus was about power, and the tribes could make the calculations as well as the white people.
The tribal negotiators were sophisticated and they used every technique and device available to
them.” Charles F. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Rights and the National Forests: The Case of the
Aboriginal Lands of the Nez Perce Tribe, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 435, 438 (1998).
39. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658,
675 (1979).
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B. UNITED STATES AND INDIAN CONSENSUAL RELATIONS POSTTREATY MAKING
In 1871, Congress ended treaty making with tribes.40 This occurred not
due to any change in the status of tribal nations but because of
congressional infighting: the House of Representatives demanded a greater
role in Indian affairs.41 Even though the treaty era ended, political,
diplomatic, and consensual relations between the entities continued
unabated.42 In fact, U.S./Indian agreements after 1871 were still often
called treaties by many, and they continued to be negotiated by the
Executive Branch and ratified by Congress.43 The only difference after
1871 was that both houses of Congress had to approve the agreements as
statutes before they became binding. This procedure and these agreements
are called treaty substitutes by scholars.44
Congress continued to spend enormous amounts of time and money
sending commissioners to tribal governments, negotiating with tribes on
various issues, formulating Indian policies, and enacting legislation
regarding the tribal nations.45 Tribes continued to consult with and petition
Congress regarding important issues.46
In addition, in more modern times, 1982–2010 in particular, federal,
state, and tribal governments have been involved in decades of negotiations
regarding water rights and have often reached agreements that Congress
later enacted into laws.47 These arrangements look remarkably like treaties.
A bit earlier, the Executive Branch and tribal and state governments were
also involved in extensive negotiations over native claims to lands and
rights in Alaska and in the eastern United States, and Congress also enacted
40. Act of March 3, 1871, § 1, 16 Stat. 544 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71). This act expressly
did not “invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made . . . .” Id.
41. PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 530-32; COHEN’s, supra note 31, at 69-70;
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1975).
42. PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 532, 676; see also Oregon Dept. of Fish and
Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985) (noting the Klamath Tribe and the United
States negotiated a 1901 agreement to modify the boundaries of the reservation that had been
established in 1864 treaty; Congress ratified the agreement).
43. 1 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 287; PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note
26, at 532, 676.
44. 1 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 1; PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES,
supra note 18, at 312.
45. See, e.g., Indian Department Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 125, 32 Stat. 245-77 (May 27,
1902); PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 687-1208 (covering the history and political
interactions between the United States and Indian tribes 1871 to 1994).
46. See, e.g., PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 759-896, 917-92, 1017-23, 10871190; United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 384 (1980).
47. See generally DANIEL MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER
SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA (2002); Peter W. Sly & Cheryl A. Maier, Indian
Water Settlements and EPA, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 1991, at 23, 24.

48

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:37

those agreements into law.48 Consequently, “treaty making” and the
historical, consensual, diplomatic relationship between Indian nations and
the United States have continued beyond the official end of treaty making
in 1871.
C. FEDERAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND THE CONSENSUAL
U.S./INDIAN RELATIONSHIP 1774–2015
In addition to the Executive Branch and Senate exercising the treaty
power to reach agreements with tribal nations, and the federal/tribal conduct
post-1871, Congress has also enacted numerous laws requiring consultation
and consent in Indian affairs. For example, in furtherance of the paradigm
of diplomatic relations with Indian nations, in 1787 the Articles of
Confederation Congress enacted the Northwest Ordinance to provide for the
future incorporation of the lands in the Northwest Territory into the United
States.49 This law expressly continued the consensual relationship the
United States had maintained with Indian governments; the Act promises
that the United States will always negotiate with Indian nations to obtain
their consent for purchases of tribal lands: “The utmost good faith shall
always be observed towards the Indians, their lands and property shall
never be taken from them without their consent . . . .”50 In 1848, Congress
applied this Act, and this consensual relationship, to the Indian nations in
the Oregon country.51
Even in federal policies that ultimately had negative effects on Indian
country, Congress regularly required the Executive Branch to engage in
prior consultations with tribes and to obtain consent. In the Removal Act of
1830, Congress instituted a policy attempting to remove all eastern tribes
west of the Mississippi River.52 Congress, however, predicated removals
on consultation, negotiation, and the consent of the tribes: “the President . .
. [may] cause so much of any territory belonging to the United States, west
48. Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785 (1980); Rhode
Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 95-395, 92 Stat. 813 (1978); COHEN’s, supra
note 31, at 326-30 (discussing Alaska native settlement act); PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note
26, at 1172-74 (discussing tribal land claims settlement acts for the Narragansetts in Rhode Island
and the Passamaquoddies and Penobscots in Maine).
49. PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
xiii, 3, 15, 25, 46 (Indiana University Press 1992). The Northwest Territory is now the modern day
states of Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.
50. DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 9 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed.
2000) (emphasis added). See also Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835)
(“[P]ossession could not be taken without [Indian] consent.”).
51. See Organic Act, § 14, 9 Stat. 323 (1848).
52. See Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830), reprinted in 3 THE AMERICAN INDIAN
AND THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 2169-71 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed.,
1973).
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of the river Mississippi . . . to be divided . . . for the reception of such tribes
or nations of Indians as may choose to exchange the lands where they now
reside, and remove there; . . .”53 And, several decades later, under the
Allotment Act of 1887, Congress required tribal consultations and consent
before reservations could be allotted and before land on reservations could
be purchased by the United States.54 As part of the allotment process, the
Secretary of the Interior negotiated with tribes over the individual allotment
plans for each specific reservation.55 Congress continued to believe that
allotting reservations required a tribe’s consent until the United States
Supreme Court, in essence, held otherwise in 1903.56
In 1899, 1901, and 1904 Congress began authorizing rights-of-way
through Indian reservations.57 Later, Congress and various agency regulations began requiring the consent of tribes before a grant or renewal of
rights-of-way.58 In the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), Congress
repeated its policy of favoring tribal consultation and consent.59 Congress
invited tribal governments through the IRA to consider drafting
constitutions and organizing their governments under those documents.60
Consultation and consent took the form of tribal communities debating
whether to enter this process61 and then holding at least two elections before
a written tribal constitution could become operative. First, the community
had to vote whether to agree to organize under the IRA; second, the
53. Id. See also PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 179-213; COHEN’S, supra note
31, at 41-51.
54. See Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2012) (“[I]t shall be lawful for the
Secretary of the Interior to negotiate . . . for the purchase . . . of such portions of its reservation
not allotted as such tribe shall, from time to time, consent to sell . . . .”); DELORIA & WILKINS,
supra note 37, at 60-61 (noting the Allotment Act required the Executive Branch to obtain tribal
consent and to negotiate to purchase Indians’ remaining lands).
55. PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 668, 867.
56. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 467 (1984). Congress enacted allotment acts reservation
by reservation “with each surplus land act employing its own statutory language, the product of a
unique set of tribal negotiation and legislative compromise.” Id. But after Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), Congress enacted allotment acts without consultation or consent.
PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 867-69.
57. Act of Mar. 2, 1899, 30 Stat. 990 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 312) (2012)); 25
U.S.C. § 311 (2012). See also PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 344-45, 401, 869 n.14;
COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 319, 1062-65.
58. 25 U.S.C. § 324 (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(a) (2015). See also 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328
(2012); 25 C.F.R. pt. 169 (2015).
59. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479
(2012)). The senator who introduced the bill stated that it would give Indians and tribes control
over their own affairs. 78 Cong. Rec. 11,125 (1934).
60. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479
(2012)).
61. See ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 258-59 (2000); Tribal Self-Government and the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955, 964-65 (1972).
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community had to draft a constitution and then consult with the Secretary of
Interior to gain approval of their constitution as drafted; and third, the
community had to hold a second election whether or not to adopt the
constitution after it had been approved by the Secretary.62
In the current era of federal Indian policy, called the SelfDetermination Era, President Richard Nixon reemphasized consultation and
consent as the federal model for working with Indian nations. Nixon stated
that the federal government should ask Indian nations what the federal
government should do for them, and with them, instead of the United States
dictating policies and programs:
It is long past time that the Indian policies of the Federal
government began to recognize and build upon the capacities and
insights of the Indian people. . . . [W]e must begin to act on the
basis of what the Indians themselves have long been telling us.
The time has come to break decisively with the past and to create
the conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is
determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.63
In response, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) began immediately
drafting procedures for consulting with Indian nations and finalized its
policy in 1972.64 Congress also accepted President Nixon’s call when it
enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
(“ISDA”) in 1975 and allowed tribes to negotiate with the United States to
assume the operation of federal Indian programs.65 Congress also required
the Secretaries of the Interior and of Health, Education, and Welfare to
consult with Indian organizations while drafting the ISDA regulations.66
And in 1978, Congress required that Indian tribes be “actively consulted” in

62. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 476(b), 503 (2012); Robert J. Miller, American Indian Constitutions
and Their Influence on the United States Constitution, 159 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHIL.
SOC’Y 32, 45-46 (Mar. 2015); THEODORE H. HAAS, TEN YEARS OF TRIBAL GOVERNMENT
UNDER I.R.A. 2, 30 (1947).
63. Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, in DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 256, 257 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000); FRANCIS PAUL
PRUCHA, THE INDIANS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE
PRESENT 72-73 (1985) (“The new watchword was ‘Indian participation.’”).
64. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 717-21 (8th Cir. 1979).
65. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450458ddd-2 (2012)). In 1994, Congress enacted the Tribal Self-Governance Act as an amendment to
the ISDA and expanded the reach of federal programs tribes could agree to operate in lieu of
federal agencies. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, §
102(18), 108 Stat. 4250, 4259, 4270 (1994); Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, SelfGovernance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251,
1262-66 (1995).
66. Pub. L. No. 93-638, § 107(b), 88 Stat. 2203, 2212 (1975) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 450-458ddd-2 (2012)).
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planning and developing educational programs for Indians and any related
activities.67
One of the major goals of the ISDA was to end the “Federal
domination of Indian service programs.”68 As part of that objective, the
ISDA allows tribal governments to agree to contracts and compacts with the
United States to take over and operate various federal Indian programs.69
Furthermore, Congress has also granted tribes far more power over
economic decision making in Indian country. For example, once tribes
have consulted with the Secretary of the Interior and received approval of
their regulatory schemes, tribes can make certain economic decisions
without further federal involvement.70
Congress has continued to support the long standing policy of
consultation with Indian nations. It is unnecessary, and perhaps even
impossible as the White House admits,71 to set out the entire laundry list of
congressional acts and administrative rules that require consultations with
tribes and sometimes tribal consent before various actions can be
undertaken.72 This article will thus only highlight some of the most
significant examples.
Congress has enacted many statutes that require consultation with
tribes for actions that might impact Indian historic, cultural, and religious

67. Pub. L. No. 95-561, §§ 1101(c), 1121-1122, 1130, 92 Stat. 2143, 2314, 2316-18, 2321
(1978) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (2012)). See also John E. Silverman, The
Miner’s Canary: Tribal Control of American Indian Education and the First Amendment, 19
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1019, 1025 (1992).
68. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a) (2012).
69. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 273 (2015).
70. See, e.g., The Hearth Act, 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2012); Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribal
Renewable Energy Development Under the HEARTH Act: An Independently Rational, but
Collectively Deficient, Option, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031 (2013); Judith V. Royster, Practical
Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy Development and SelfDetermination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065 (2008).
71. The White House tribal consultation list of January 2009 includes this caveat: “[This list]
does not purport to be comprehensive or all encompassing.” List of Federal Tribal Consultation
Statutes, Orders, Regulations, Rules, Policies, Manuals, Protocols and Guidance [hereinafter List
of Federal Tribal Consultation Statutes], http://www ncai.org/attachments/Consultation_hJYORX
OnCSfagkpaeFLgYFNCffnFTxSpQNdqyejdardbxFCdFUz1%20fed%20consultation%20authoriti
es%202-09%20ACHP%20version6-9pdf.
72. For an exhaustive listing of federal statutes and regulations that require tribal
consultations, see Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of
Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 21 n.3
(2000). See also 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2012) (noting the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
requires consultations between the Secretary of Interior, tribes, and states in certain
circumstances); 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012) (amending a 1968 statutory provision, which allowed
states to assume criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations, to require tribal consent to any
future state assumptions).
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issues: the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979,73 the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990,74 and the 1992
amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act.75 And very
recently, Congress has provided for tribal governments to consult and to
consent on whether to opt in to new initiatives expanding their criminal
jurisdiction. Tribal governments that consent to exercise expanded powers
over domestic violence and other crimes on reservations have to consult
with federal agencies and officials, adopt various provisions, and obtain
federal approvals before exercising this expanded jurisdiction.76
The regulations enacted pursuant to the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act require the United States to organize and
work with a committee composed of tribal leaders and religious leaders, to
consult, and whenever possible, to reach agreements on how to handle the
sensitive issues related to religious objects and graves.77 The Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation drafted the regulations for the 1992
amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act, and the relevant
provisions require federal officials to consult with tribes on historic and
cultural property issues, to negotiate and reach mutual consent on
agreements regarding these issues, and to allow tribal governments to
participate in the resolution of any adverse effects.78
Administrative agencies have also promulgated numerous regulations
requiring tribal consultation and, in some situations, consent. For example,
73. Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721, 727 (1979) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470ii (2012))
(promulgation of regulations allowed only after tribal consultations). Also, before issuing
excavation permits under this Act which might result in harm to religiously or culturally
significant sites, federal officials must notify and consult with affected tribes. 16 U.S.C. §
470cc(c) (2012); 43 C.F.R. § 7.7(a) (2015).
74. Pub. L. No. 101-601, § 5, 104 Stat. 3048, 3052 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 30013013 (2012)). The Act requires the drafting of regulations and several other decisions to be
conducted only after consultations with Indian tribes and traditional religious leaders. 25 U.S.C.
§§ 3002(b), 3002(c)(2), 3002(d), 3003(b)(1)(A), 3004(b)(1)(B), 3005(a)(3), 3006(b)(1)(A) (2012)
(agencies to draft regulations only after consulting with the Nagpra committee comprised mostly
of tribal representatives); see also 43 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2014).
75. Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 4006(a), 106 Stat. 4600, 4757 (1992) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 470x-6 (2012)) (repealed by Pub. L. 113-287, §7, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3272). See
also 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(B) (requiring government-to-government consultations with tribes)
(repealed by Pub. L. 113-287, §7, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3272).
76. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 903, 127 Stat. 54,
120 (2013) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 14045 (2015)); Tribal Law and Order Act, Pub. L. No. 111211, 124 Stat. 2261 (2010).
77. 43 C.F.R. §§ 10.1(b), 10.5(b)(3), 10.5(f), 10.8(d), 10.9(b) (2014).
78. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.2(c)(2), 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A) (2014). Federal agencies are to engage in
consultation and consent situations in a sensitive manner; agencies should always be aware of the
federal trust responsibility to tribes and the government-to-government relationship and can enter
any agreements regarding these issues. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(B)-(C), (E). Agencies should
consult with any concerned tribe, 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a), and work cooperatively to resolve adverse
effects. 36 C.F.R. § 800.6.
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regulations under the National Environmental Policy Act require federal
agencies to invite affected tribes to participate in planning efforts and
require agencies to consult with Indian tribes early in their planning
processes.79 The Departments of the Interior and Health and Human
Services have also promulgated rules that require them to consult and reach
certain agreements with tribal governments.80 Other federal agencies have
also promulgated regulations that require them to plan various actions in
consultation and cooperation with tribes.81 In conclusion, it is clear that
consultation with Indian nations is a legal requirement for the federal
government in many fields of endeavor, and often tribal consent must also
be obtained.
D. CONSULTATION CASE LAW
Indian nations have filed a significant number of lawsuits regarding
what they perceive as insufficient federal consultations. Tribal governments have prevailed in many of these cases82 and lost many others.83 In

79. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2(d)(2), 1501.7(a)(1) (2014).
80. See generally 25 C.F.R. Part 900 (2015) (negotiating ISDA contracts); 25 C.F.R. Part
1000 (2015) (negotiating Tribal Self Governance Act compacts). See also 25 C.F.R. § 900.119
(2014) (federal officials must consult with tribal officials); 25 C.F.R. § 1000.161 (2014) (federal
officials must negotiate compacts with tribal officials); 25 C.F.R. § 1000.182 (2014) (tribes must
consent to assume federal programs).
81. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(a)(1) (2014) (National Forest System); 36 C.F.R. §
219.4(a)(1)(3), (b) (2014) (noting the responsible official should consult on a government-togovernment basis, keep in mind the federal trust responsibility, seek native knowledge, and
coordinate with tribes); 36 C.F.R. § 219.12 (2014) (stating the responsible office should
collaborate and cooperatively develop goals); 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(c)(3)(iii) (2014) (monitoring of
forest plans to be conducted jointly with federal, state, local, and tribal governments); 30 C.F.R. §
750.6(d) (2014) (directing the BIA to consult with tribes regarding Interior’s Office of Surface
Mining activities on Indian lands); 25 C.F.R. § 262.3(b)(1) (2015) (stating federal land managers
must notify tribes before issuing archaeological research permits on Indian lands); 25 C.F.R. §
900.119 (2015) (noting BIA and Indian Health Services must consult with tribes before spending
any planning or design funding on ISDA construction projects).
82. See, e.g., Pit River Tribe v. U. S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
federal agencies violated National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”) consultation requirements
by not consulting with tribe over historic sites before extending geothermal leases); Muckleshoot
Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1999) (enjoining Forest Service from
exchanging lands with a timber company because of violating National Environmental Policy Act
and NHPA consultation duties); Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 2010 WL 3434091 (E.D. Wash. 2010) (holding that Department of Agriculture
failed to consult with the nation before siting a landfill that would interfere with treaty hunting and
fishing rights); N. Cheyenne Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 32 Indian L. Rptr. 3270, 327475 (D. Mont. June 6, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (holding that BLM violated NHPA consultation
duties and breached the agency’s trust responsibility to consult); Klamath Tribes v. United States,
1996 WL 924509 (D. Or. Oct. 2, 1996) (holding Forest Service failed to consult regarding timber
sales on tribal lands in violation of trust duty to avoid adversely affecting treaty resources).
83. See, e.g., Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 608 F.3d 592,
608-10 (9th Cir. 2010); Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., 545 F.3d
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2010, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California issued
an opinion that was a bit surprising. In light of what looked like an extensive record of federal consultations with the Quechan Tribe (“Tribe”), the
court held that the putative consultations did not comply with the legal
requirements.84
In this case, the federal government was trying to fast-track a large
solar energy development in California on 6500 acres of land managed by
the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”).85 Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the project had to break ground by
December 31, 2010, to qualify for federal stimulus funding.86
Consequently, it appeared that BLM was actively pushing the project
ahead.87 The relevant lands, however, were known to contain an estimated
459 cultural resources (historic trails, burials, and archaeological sites) that
were important to the Tribe and of historic significance, thus deserving of
NHPA procedures.88 After becoming dissatisfied with federal consultation
efforts, which the Tribe viewed as inadequate, lacking meaning, and
coming after BLM had already approved the project, the Tribe filed suit for
a preliminary injunction which the court granted on December 15, 2010.89
The Tribe’s complaint alleged that BLM had reached a decision to
approve the project prior to evaluating the historic and cultural resources
under NHPA and before engaging in consultation with the Tribe as required
by the Act.90 The BLM, however, presented the court with a lengthy list of
what it claimed were consultations and attempts to consult with the Tribe.91
The court then engaged in a detailed analysis (more than eight pages of the
opinion) examining item by item each piece of evidence presented by the
BLM to decide whether the legally required consultations had occurred.92
Despite dozens of claimed incidents of consultation with tribes in general
and with Tribe employees and hosting many public meetings on the project,
1207, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2008); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Warwick Sewer Auth., 334 F.3d 161
(1st Cir. 2003).
84. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 755 F. Supp.
2d 1104, 1118-19, 1122 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
85. Id. at 1106-07.
86. Id. at 1119.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1107.
89. Id. at 1108, 1122.
90. Id. at 1106-08.
91. Id. at 1111.
92. Id. at 1111-20. Compare id. with Ke-Kin-is-Uqs v. British Columbia (Minister of
Forests), 2008 BCSC 1505, paras. 42, 50 (Can. B.C.), where the British Columbia Supreme Court
considered a 1663 page “consultation record” supplied by government lawyers and decided that
much of it was just draft meeting notes and not minutes of actual consultations, and much of it
was specialized terminology not understandable to outsiders; the record did not “speak for itself.”
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the court held the evidence demonstrated that “the Tribe [was] likely to
prevail at least on its claim that it was not adequately consulted as required
under NHPA before the project was approved.”93 The court then issued a
preliminary injunction notwithstanding the “balance of the equities” and the
“public interest” elements that it had to weigh before enjoining the
construction of this important, alternative energy project.94
It is possible that this case will be seen as an outlier because of the
strict requirements and close scrutiny the court imposed on the BLM.
Moreover, the district judge seemed irked by the impression created by
BLM that it was “padding the record,” when it provided the court with
irrelevant string citations without explanations, blurred the crucial
chronology of the consultation process, and grouped all tribes together as
one entity instead of just discussing its actual consultations with the
Quechan Tribe.95
Another case worth highlighting is a 1995 Tenth Circuit decision that
held the U.S. Forest Service violated section 106 of the NHPA because it
failed to properly consult with the Sandia Pueblo and to make good faith
and reasonable efforts to identify historic resources.96 In fact, one hopes
that this situation is an outlier because the Forest Service did not take the
NHPA “very seriously,” ignored relevant evidence it received, seemed to
not really want to find information that tribal sources might provide, and
withheld very relevant information from the state historic preservation
officer.97 Not surprisingly, the Tenth Circuit found a violation of the
NHPA consultation requirements and ruled against the Forest Service.98
In sum, the duty of federal consultation and consent with Indian nations
is a very well-established legal principle in the history, statutes, administrative regulations, and caselaw of the United States. This fact leads to
important questions about how consultation and consent is playing out in
modern-day U.S./Indian affairs and how the United States actions compare

93. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 755 F. Supp.
2d 1104, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
94. Id. at 1120-22.
95. Id. at 1111-12. In comparison, in 2013 the Quechan Tribe lost a separate case about
consultation with the BLM regarding the Ocotillo Wind Energy Facility Project. Quechan Tribe
of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U. S. Dep’t of the Interior, 927 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Cal.
2013). The judge in the 2013 case distinguished the 2010 case on the facts concerning BLM’s
consultations with the Tribe. Id. at 932-33. In total, these two cases are valuable comparisons that
can educate agencies on a range of methods and types of consultation efforts that do and do not
meet legal requirements.
96. Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 861-63 (10th Cir. 1995).
97. Id. at 858-62.
98. Id. at 863.
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to international norms of consultation and consent in dealing with Indigenous peoples.
III. CURRENT UNITED STATES CONSULTATION PROCEDURES:
FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT?
The procedures and efforts the United States currently utilizes to
consult with Indian nations began coalescing in 1993. In that year,
President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12,875 entitled “Enhancing
the Intergovernmental Partnership.”99 This Order requires executive agencies to “develop an effective process” that establishes “regular and
meaningful consultation and collaboration with State, local, and tribal
governments on Federal matters that significantly or uniquely affect their
communities.”100 Clinton followed that Order in 1994 with a presidential
memorandum entitled “Government-to-Government Relations with Native
American Tribal Governments.”101 This memo strengthened the 1993
Order, now requiring executive branch agencies to “consult, to the greatest
extent practicable and to the extent permitted by law, with tribal
governments prior to taking actions that affect federally recognized tribal
governments.”102 The head of each executive department and agency was
charged with ensuring that the Order was communicated to and complied
with by their respective departments.103 The Order and memorandum were
binding, of course, on all executive branch agencies and officials.
In 1996, Clinton continued ordering federal consultations. In Executive Order 13,007, he directed federal agencies to accommodate native and
tribal access to sacred sites, to create procedures to notify tribes if federal
actions might restrict access to or adversely affect sacred sites, and to
undertake their actions relative to sacred sites in compliance with the
consultation procedures of his 1994 memorandum.104 The President also
now sought to monitor agency compliance with his directives by requiring
reports on their implementation of this Order.105
In 1998 and 2000, President Clinton issued even stronger orders
regarding tribal consultations. In 1998, he required agencies “to establish
regular and meaningful consultation and collaboration with Indian tribal
99. Exec. Order No. 12,875, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,093 (Oct. 26, 1993).
100. Id. at 58,903.
101. 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (April 29, 1994). The President also required consultations with
tribes on issues concerning environmental justice. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629
(Feb. 11, 1994).
102. 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,951.
103. Id. at 22,953.
104. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771, 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
105. Id.
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governments in the development of regulatory practices on Federal matters
that significantly or uniquely affect their communities.”106 Even in
formulating federal policies, agencies were to be guided by principles of
Indian self-government and sovereignty, treaty rights, and the unique legal
relationship between tribal governments and the United States.107 Each
agency was ordered to develop consultation procedures for tribes “to
provide meaningful and timely input in the development of regulatory
policies” and to avoid promulgating regulations that affect tribal
governments unless certain conditions were met.108 When agency issues
relate to tribal self-government, tribal trust resources, or treaty and other
rights, agencies should “where appropriate, use consensual mechanisms for
developing regulations.”109
In 2000, Clinton replaced the 1998 Order with Executive Order 13,175,
“Consultation and Cooperation with Indian Tribal Governments.”110 Order
13,175 is still in effect today. It includes almost all of the provisions that
were in the 1998 Order and greatly expands on them.
The 2000 Order was also issued “to establish regular and meaningful
consultation and collaboration with tribal officials in the development of
Federal policies.”111 It reaches far beyond just formal agency rulemaking,
however, and includes tribal consultations to develop “regulations,
legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or
actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on
the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on
the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal
Government and Indian tribes.”112 For example, agencies proposing new
regulations that have tribal implications are required to consult with tribal
officials “early in the process,” and they must describe in the Federal
Register the extent of the agency’s prior consultation with tribal officials.113
The 2000 Order also expressly directs that agencies develop “an
accountable process,” and for the first time, imposes deadlines on the
development of agency consultation procedures.114 In fact, agencies were
given only thirty days after the Order became effective to designate an
official with primary responsibility for implementing the Order, and then
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998).
Id. at 27,655.
Id.
Id. at 27,656 (emphasis added).
Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
Id. at 67,249.
Id. See also id. at 67,250.
Id. at 67,250.
Id.
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that official had only sixty days after the effective date of the Order to
submit a description of the agency’s consultation process to the Office of
Management and Budget (“OMB”).115 Also noteworthy, and like the 1998
Order, the 2000 Order requires agencies, when “issues relat[e] to tribal selfgovernment, tribal trust resources, or Indian tribal treaty and other rights” to
“explore and, where appropriate, use consensual mechanisms for
developing regulations.”116 The 2000 Order increases the obligations on
agencies in these situations by including the admonition that they should
consider using “negotiated rulemaking” (i.e., rules developed in conjunction
with tribal governments) to develop their regulations.117
President George W. Bush expressly stated his support for Executive
Order 13,175 in his 2004 presidential memorandum entitled “Governmentto-Government Relationship with Tribal Governments.”118 In 2009,
President Barack Obama also expressly reaffirmed Executive Order 13,175
in a presidential memorandum.119 Moreover, President Obama imposed
new duties and deadlines on agencies. Each agency head was granted ninety
days to submit a “detailed plan” to OMB on the actions the agency would
take to implement Order 13,175.120 The plans themselves had to “be
developed after consultation by the agency with Indian tribes and tribal
officials.”121 Agency heads were also required to file progress reports with
OMB within 270 days, and annually thereafter, on the status of each action
included in their consultation plans.122 The President also ordered OMB to

115. Id.
116. Id. at 67,251 (emphasis added).
117. Id. See also Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561 et seq.; WILLIAM F.
FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND
PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 134-35 (5th ed. 2014) (describing the negotiated rulemaking
process); Robert J. Miller & Dean Suagee, The New Indian Housing Act and Some of Its
Environmental Implications, 13-19 (AMERICAN BAR ASS’N CONFERENCE 1997),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1247853 (explaining the author’s experience
with the Department of Housing and Urban Development negotiated rulemaking committee which
included forty-eight tribal representatives).
118. Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship with Tribal Governments, 2
PUB. PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Bush Memorandum], http://www2.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2013-08/documents/president-bush-2004.pdf.
119. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Tribal
Consultation, (Nov. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Obama Memorandum], http://www2.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2013-08/documents/tribal-consultation-memorandum-09.pdf.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. See also U.S. Department of the Treasury, Department of the Treasury Progress
Report to OMB on Tribal Consultation, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economicpolicy/tribal-policy/Documents/2014%20Consultation%20Report.pdf; U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Action Plan for Tribal Consultation and Collaboration: Plan Submitted Pursuant to
President Memorandum Dated November 5, 2009, http://www.usda.gov/documents/Consultation
Plan.pdf.
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compile a report on the implementation of Order 13,175 across the entire
executive branch and to make recommendations, if any, for improving
agency consultation plans and improving the tribal consultation process.123
After all these presidential orders and memoranda, and the federal laws
and regulations discussed in Part II.C, it is no surprise that there has been an
enormous amount of activity in the federal government regarding tribal
consultations and the drafting of agency consultation policies and
procedures. But our focus here is not to examine these myriad agency
policies one by one but instead to determine the procedures for consultation
that have developed from all these laws, Executive Orders, and policies.
From these determinations, we hope to understand what is effective and
beneficial for tribal governments and communities and if they approach the
emerging international law regime of free, prior, and informed consent.
A. FEDERAL CONSULTATION PROCEDURES
A very active federal process for consulting with Indian nations has
developed from the laws, regulations, Executive Orders, and memoranda
already discussed. Executive branch agencies and many independent
federal agencies have drafted consultation policies, engaged in extensive
consultation trainings, and subsequently engaged in myriad consultations
with tribal governments.124 In addition, after the 2000 Clinton Executive
Order, the OMB Director issued a memorandum directing each Executive
Branch department to designate a specific employee to serve as a tribal
coordinator and to be the contact point for agency compliance with the
Order.125 In reaction, many agencies have created tribal liaison positions,126

123. Obama Memorandum, supra note 119.
124. The author has conducted numerous tribal consultation training sessions over the past
fifteen years with federal agencies, including the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, BLM, U.S. Forest
Service, and the Bonneville Power Administration.
125. Jacob J. Lew, Guidance for Implementing E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination
with Indian Tribal Governments (Jan. 11, 2001), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/memoranda/m01-07.pdf. In 2010, the OMB Director issued similar guidance. Peter R.
Orszag, Guidance for Implementing E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian
Tribal Governments (July 30, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
memoranda/2010/m10-33.pdf.
126. National Congress of American Indians, Consultation with Tribal Nations: An Update
on Implementation of Executive Order 13175, at 6-9 (Jan. 2012), http://www ncai.org/
attachments/Consultation_hxjBLgmqyYDiGehEwgXDsRIUKvwZZKjJOjwUnKjSQeoVaGOMvf
l_Consultation_Report_-_Jan_2012_Update.pdf. In 2013, President Obama created the White
House Council on Native American Affairs. Exec. Order No. 13,647, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,539 (June
26, 2013).
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and all of this activity in the past two decades has led to greatly increased
agency attention to tribal issues and thousands of tribal consultations.127
There is no mandated federal process for how to conduct tribal
consultations, but fairly standardized principles are being followed by most
of the Executive Branch agencies, and best practices are well-known. For
example, the independent federal agency, the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, was tasked with drafting the regulations for the 1992
amendments to the NHPA, which added American Indian issues to historic
preservation matters. These regulations define consultations with tribal
nations regarding historically significant properties as “the process of
seeking, discussing, and considering the views of other participants, and,
where feasible, seeking agreement with them regarding matters arising in
the section 106 process.”128 The regulations require that consultations be
“appropriate to the scale of the undertaking,”129 “commence early in the
planning process,”130 and “provide[ ] the Indian tribe . . . a reasonable
opportunity to identify its concerns about historic properties, advise on the
identification and evaluation of historic properties . . . and participate in the
resolution of adverse effects.”131 Obviously, these rules provide an active
and important role for tribes in historic preservation matters.132 Other
agencies also drafted similar rules and policies.
We can divine a pretty clear process for tribal consultations from the
NHPA regulations: (1) identify when agency actions might impact tribal
interests, (2) confer with the relevant tribal nation early in the agency’s
planning process, (3) provide tribes reasonable opportunities to identify
their concerns about potential agency actions and to identify and evaluate

127. See, e.g., National Congress of American Indians, supra note 126, at 14, 16, 20-21, 2425, 28-31; List of Federal Tribal Consultation Statutes, supra note 71 (providing a twelve page
list of executive branch and military branch policies on tribal consultations); Colette Routel &
Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation in the 21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
417, 436-48, 463 (2013).
128. 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(f) (2014) (emphasis added).
129. Id. at § 800.2(a)(4).
130. Id. at § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A).
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. Agencies can enter agreements with tribes on how consultations will be carried out. 36
C.F.R. § 800.2c(2)(ii)(E); Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Consultation with Indian
Tribes in the Section 106 Review Process: A Handbook 25 (November 2008), http://www.achp.
gov/regs-tribes2008.pdf. Under the heading “Tips for Successful Consultations,” the Handbook
advises agencies to engage in respectful communications, to consult early and often, and to
conduct effective meetings. Id. at 27-29. A 2010 OMB directive even ordered agencies to
encourage tribes to develop their own policies to achieve program objectives; where possible to
defer to tribes to establish standards; and in determining whether to establish federal standards, to
consult with tribal officials as to the need for federal standards or to otherwise preserve the
prerogatives and authority of Indian tribes. Orszag, supra note 125.
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tribal interests, and (4) allow tribes to participate in the resolution of
potential adverse effects.133
The NHPA rules are not the only set of regulations that suggest specific
federal procedures.134 Attorney General Eric Holder, for example,
approved the Justice Department’s policy statement on tribal consultations
in 2013.135 The Department identified four crucial procedures for
consultations: (1) timely and adequate notice to the appropriate parties, (2)
accessibility and convenience to tribal participants, (3) a meaningful
process, and (4) transparency and accountability throughout the process.136
In 1998, the Secretary of the Interior defined consultations regarding
historic properties that would be held with any appropriate party, including
tribes, in this fashion:
Consultation means the process of seeking, discussing, and
considering the view of others, and, where feasible, seeking
agreement with them on how historic properties should be
identified, considered, and managed. Consultation is built upon
the exchange of ideas, not simply providing information.137
The U.S. Forest Service (“Service”) issues an interim directive on tribal
consultations as part of the Forest Service Handbook.138 Forest Service line
officers can only conduct government-to-government consultations with
tribal leaders who have been authorized to consult on behalf of their
tribe.139 The Service sets some time deadlines, and Service officials are
encouraged to facilitate consultations by providing funding in some
circumstances to tribes or tribal representatives.140 The agency defines its
step-by-step process as: (1) contact the tribal government, preferably prior
133. See Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, supra note 132, at 3, 5-8, 11, 14-16.
134. The U.S. Department of Agriculture defines tribal consultation as “the timely,
meaningful, and substantive dialogue between USDA officials who have delegated authority to
consult and the official leadership of Federally recognized tribes, or their designated
representative, pertaining to USDA policies that may have Tribal implications.” Office of Tribal
Relations, United States Department of Agriculture, Who We Are, http://www.usda.gov/wps/
portal/usda/usdahome?navid=otr (last updated Feb. 26, 2013).
135. Attorney General Eric Holder, Department of Justice Policy Statement on Tribal
Consultation (August 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/otj/docs/dojmemorandum-tibal-consultation.pdf.
136. Id. at 5.
137. National Park Service & Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, The Secretary of
the Interior’s Standards and Guidelines for Federal Agency Historic Preservation Programs
Pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act 30 (1998) [hereinafter Interior’s Standards]
(emphasis omitted and added), http://gpmuellerdesign.com/portfolio/multimedia/itam_cd/
documents/Cultural%20Resource%20Documents/Standards%20and%20Guidelines.pdf.
138. U.S. Forest Service, American Indian and Alaska Native Relations Handbook (April 1,
2014), http://www fs fed.us/im/directives/fsh/1509.13/ (last visited June 19, 2015).
139. Id. at 7.
140. Id. at 8-9.
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to scoping and public involvement, to advise the tribe of a proposed policy,
plan, or project that may affect tribal rights; (2) allow tribes to respond; (3)
tribes may request federal technical experts to meet with the tribes’
technical representatives or with the tribe; (4) issues are discussed so the
agency understands tribal concerns; (5) consultation steps are defined and
an agreement may be reached on the consultation process; and (6) the
agency makes a decision in consultation with the tribe.141 These examples
demonstrate the general outline of federal consultation procedures.
B. BEST PRACTICES
Much has been written about tribal/federal consultations and many
reports and studies have been conducted on the subject. In addition to the
federal procedures that have developed, there are generally accepted best
practices that should be part of any effective consultation. Interestingly,
having the outcome, the agency decision, be what a specific tribe desired is
not necessarily indicative of whether a tribal nation thinks the consultation
process was worthwhile and effective. Just as in court proceedings, being
fairly heard, being allowed to adequately present your argument, and
having the decision maker seriously consider your views is an important
best practice for successful consultations, notwithstanding the final
decision.142
This article will now briefly highlight some of the generally accepted
best practices.143 It must be noted that many federal agencies have already
incorporated some of these practices.
 Conduct consultations on a true government-to-government,
equal-footing basis.144
141. Id. at 8.
142. National Association of Tribal Historic Preservation Officers, Tribal Consultation: Best
Practices in Historic Preservation, 35, 39 (May 2005) [hereinafter NATHPO], http://www.
nathpo.org/PDF/ Tribal Consultation.pdf.
143. In 2006, the National Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”) proposed a very detailed
description of best practices for the federal government to use when consulting with tribal nations.
Proposed Minimum Requirements of a Valid Consultation Prior to Taking Federal Action,
http://www ncai.org/attachments/ConsultationqikBfAquyWllLGSqdNYagbaMeCHbArgkPhBppx
NXdDcYhNXMPCu2%20NCAITestimony-HR5608.pdf. NCAI repeated many of these
suggestions in a 2009 letter to the Department of Agriculture Secretary. Letter from National
Congress of American Indians to Department of Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, (Dec. 14,
2009), Background and Recommendations at 1-4 [hereinafter NCAI Letter], http://www ncai.org/
attachments/ConsultationustVpCDczCqwJLHCixLQIraeUjlUzDypiZusMhFQGeuEMPMMjRAU
SDA.pdf.
144. NATHPO, supra note 142, at 39; National Cooperative Highway Research Program,
Successful Practices for Effective Tribal Consultation, 124 (Sept. 2013) [hereinafter NCHRP],
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/docs/NCHRP25-25%2879%29_FR.pdf; DARBY C.
STAPP & MICHAEL S. BURNEY, TRIBAL CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: THE FULL CIRCLE
TO STEWARDSHIP 122 (2002).
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Show respect, and listen and consider tribal comments
carefully.145
 Consult as early as possible in the planning process and
provide frequent communications and multiple consultations.146
 Provide full and candid project information and ample notice
of consultation meetings.147
 Conduct meetings at both agency and tribal locations, and
conduct effective meetings to save everyone time and to
accomplish the objectives.148
 Provide funding for tribes to consult if at all possible.149
 Note that confidentiality of tribal and Indian communications
is legally allowed in certain circumstances.150
This partial list of best practices,151 and the actual federal procedures
discussed above, leads naturally to the question of what do Indian nations
think of federal consultations.

145. See NCHRP, supra note 144, at 124; Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, supra
note 132, at 27; STAPP & BURNEY, supra note 144, at 122; Patricia L. Parker & Thomas F. King,
National Park Service, NATIONAL REGISTER BULLETIN 38, Guidelines for Evaluating and
Documenting Traditional Cultural Properties 7-8 (1998), http://www.nps.gov/history/nr/
publications/bulletins/pdfs/nrb38.pdf.
146. Interior’s Standards, supra note 137, at 30; NATHPO, supra note 142, at 39; Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation, supra note 132, at 27-29; NCHRP, supra note 144, at 124. Cf.
Parker & King, supra note 145, at 7-8; STAPP & BURNEY, supra note 144, at 122-23.
147. Interior’s Standards, supra note 137, at 31; Advisory Council on Historic Preservation,
supra note 132, at 29-30; NATHPO, supra note 142, at 39.
148. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, supra note 132, at 29; NATHPO, supra note
142, at 39.
149. NCHRP, supra note 144, at 125; STAPP & BURNEY, supra note 144, at 121 (stating that
most tribes lack discretionary funds and cannot consult on an equal footing without funding).
150. Interior’s Standards, supra note 137, at 31; Advisory Council on Historic Preservation,
supra note 132, at 19; 36 C.F.R. § 800.11(c)(1); see Parker & King, supra note 145, at 8.
151. See also Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series
C 172 (Nov. 28, 2007), para. 133 (suggesting steps for Suriname to effectively consult with the
Saramaka: consult early in the development process and pursuant to Indigenous customs and
traditions, accept and disseminate full information with constant communications, and conduct the
consultation in good faith and with the objective of reaching an agreement); Jeremie Gilbert &
Cathal Doyle, A New Dawn Over the Land: Shedding Light on Collective Ownership and Consent,
in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 315
(Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS] (listing best
practices as good faith; free from all external manipulations or coercion or intimidation; consult
early in the process before approving any project activities; full disclosures of all information;
Indigenous peoples have the right to approve or reject a project based on their community
consensus and traditional decision making procedures; might require multiple consents spanning
the entire project life cycle; and effective grievance mechanisms).
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C. THE TRIBAL RESPONSE—TOO MUCH AND TOO LITTLE
Tribal governments and communities are pleased when the United
States respects their rights, interests, and sovereignty, and when they are
able to participate in making decisions about projects and actions that might
impact their interests.152 But tribal governments have many concerns about
current federal consultation efforts and would no doubt argue that best
practices are rarely used in federal consultations. Ironically, federal efforts
to date might be both “too much” and “too little.”
The consultations might be “too much” because there are myriad
federal agencies that are all clamoring for tribal governments to consult
with on every subject under the sun. Tribal governments have been
inundated with consultation requests in recent decades.153 The presidential
executive orders and memoranda have created a cottage industry in tribal
consultations. But most Indian governments do not have sufficient numbers
of employees, government officials, and/or the funding to effectively study,
plan, travel, and fully engage in all of these requested consultations.154
Consequently, the National Congress of American Indians, the preeminent
national tribal organization, suggested in 2006 that the federal government
should distinguish between major federal actions of national importance
that require substantial and prolonged consultations versus actions of minor
importance.155
More importantly, the federal consultations are also “too little” in that
many tribes and Indians see them as almost meaningless and that tribal
input produces so few and such minor, concrete results as to not be worth
the time, effort, and money tribes and individual Indians are expending.156
The lack of a consent requirement—actual consent by a tribe before federal
agencies can proceed—is one of the main sticking points. In addition, the
United Nations Declaration and the newly adopted standard of free, prior,
and informed consent have raised the bar and the expectations for Indian
nations about consulting with the federal government.
152. See NCAI Letter, supra note 143, Background and Recommendations at 1.
153. Testimony of National Congress of American Indians 4 (April 9, 2008) [hereinafter
Testimony] (stating that tribal leaders are being “consulted to death” and noting over thirty
consultations in the past year alone), http://www ncai.org/attachments/ConsultationqikBfAquy
WllLGSqdNYagbaMeCHbArgk PhBppxNXdDcYhNXMPCu2%20NCAITestimony-HR5608.pdf;
NCAI Letter, supra note 143.
154. Testimony, supra note 153, at 4.
155. National Congress of American Indians, Resolution #SAC 06-026, 1-2, Adopted 63d
Annual Session, Sacramento, CA (Oct. 1-6, 2006), http://www ncai.org/attachments/
ConsultationqikBfAquyWllLGSqdNYagbaMeCHbArgkPhBppxNXdDcYhNXMPCu2%20NCAI
Testimony-HR5608.pdf.
156. See Testimony, supra note 153, at 1, 4; Haskew, supra note 72, at 28 (stating that
consultations that are not enforceable “are ultimately worthless.”).
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1. Meaningful Consultations
Many tribal leaders do not believe they have much input regarding the
actual decisions being made by federal agencies.157 Often agencies have
already made a decision and/or committed funding to a project before
consulting with tribes, and the consultation is really more an example of
“decide and defend” or procedural hoop jumping.158 A real consultation is
supposed to enable one party to provide input about its concerns and
expectations to another before a decision is made and to see the information
given and opinions expressed integrated into the decision-making process.
Tribes complain that this rarely happens in the United States. For example,
a Navajo Nation president described the consultations that occur at the
Bureau of Indian Affairs Tribal Budget Advisory Council in this way:
[T]ribal leaders come in to ask the BIA for help to protect our
resources, our culture, our existence. . . . While the tribal leaders
pour out their hearts talking about the needs of their people, BIA
bureaucrats impassively listening. All the while, the BIA officials
know that the budgetary decisions have already been made, and
that “consultation” is nothing more than a pretense to being able to
say that we listened and took notes . . . . Consultation in my mind
is more than sitting there and listening; consultation is acting on
the information.159
The National Congress of American Indians also states that agencies
vary in their interpretations of what constitutes meaningful consultations,160
and that federal consultation policies are still “uneven in their application or
adoption across entire departments.”161

157. See NCAI Letter, supra note 143, Background and Recommendations at 1; Testimony,
supra note 153, at 1-2; STAPP & BURNEY, supra note 144, at 122 (arguing that if tribal
recommendations and comments are not listened to and seriously considered, then the process is
meaningless and a waste of the tribe’s time).
158. See NCAI Letter, supra note 143, Background and Recommendations at 3; Testimony,
supra note 153, at 2 (agency already made decision); STAPP & BURNEY, supra note 144, at 119-20
(asking does an agency truly want to know something or is it just checking the box “Have you
consulted?”); Haskew, supra note 72, at 25.
159. Hearing on H.R. 3490, H.R. 3522, H.R. 5608, H.R. 5680, and S. 2457 Before the H.
Comm. on Natural Resources, 110th Cong. 4 (2008) (statement of Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr., President of
the Navajo Nation) [hereinafter Hearing], http://naturalresources. house.gov/uploadedfiles/Shirley
testimony04.09.08.pdf.
160. See generally National Congress of American Indians, supra note 126.
161. Testimony, supra note 153, at 6. Accord NCAI Letter, supra note 143, Background and
Recommendations at 1-2; Hearing, supra note 159, at 1, 3-4 (statement of Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr.,
President of the Navajo Nation).
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Tribal leaders also often complain that they are not allowed to consult
with the real decision makers.162 Tribes often request to meet with senior
agency officials but that rarely occurs.163 In fact, in 2013 ten tribes walked
out of an alleged consultation on the Keystone pipeline because President
Obama was not in attendance.164 Also, in 2001 over 200 tribal
representatives walked out of a Department of Housing and Urban
Development meeting, which was ironically about the HUD consultation
process, because they did not believe the consultation respected tribal
sovereignty or was a true government-to-government consultation.165
2. Enforceable Consultations
The Executive Orders and memoranda expressly state that they are not
legally enforceable and do not create any rights, benefits, or new trust
responsibilities for Indian tribes.166 Furthermore, they can be withdrawn by
later presidents or less vigorously enforced by later administrations.167
Thus, some tribal leaders have advocated for a concrete method to hold the
federal government accountable for failing to consult or for ignoring tribal
views. Without a means of enforceability, the only remedy available to
tribes is to complain to the president that an executive branch agency is
failing to consult.168 For this very reason, in 2008 H.R. 5608 was
introduced “to establish regular and meaningful consultation and

162. Testimony, supra note 153, at 4. See also Routel & Holth, supra note 127, at 458
(noting the federal government usually sends low-ranking employees to consultation sessions).
163. See Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 755 F.
Supp. 2d 1104, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
164. Jacob Devaney, Sovereign Nations Walk Out of Meeting With U.S. State Department
Unanimously Rejecting Keystone XL Pipeline, HUFFINGTON POST, May 17, 2013,
http://www huffingtonpost.com/jacob-devaney/sovereign-nations-walk-ou_b_3289501 html;
Chiefs Declare Keystone XL Consultation Meeting Invalid, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, May 17,
2013,
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/05/17/chiefs-declare-keystone-xlconsultation-meeting-invalid-walk-out-state-department.
165. Brian Stockes, Tribes Reject HUD Consultation Policy, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY,
Aug.
1,
2001,
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2001/08/01/tribes-reject-hudconsultation-policy-85005.
166. Exec. Order No. 13,175, supra note 110, at 67,252; Bush Memorandum, supra note
118; Obama Memorandum, supra note 119, at 57,882 (Nov. 9, 2009). One commentator states
that “consultation rights” that “create no substantive duty on the part of the agency” shows that
“‘consultation’ is the latest federal codeword for lip service.” Haskew, supra note 72, at 73.
167. See Hearing, supra note 159, at 3 (statement of Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr., President of the
Navajo Nation).
168. See NCAI Letter, supra note 143, Background and Recommendations at 2-3;
Testimony, supra note 153, at 4; Hearing, supra note 159, at 3 (statement of Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr.,
President of the Navajo Nation) (“Executive Orders and memorandums do not carry the full force
of law. Presidents for decades have paid lip service to the idea of tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination with little practical effect.”).
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collaboration with tribal officials in the development of Federal policies.”169
The bill defined an “accountable consultation process” and would have
created a legal right to consultations that tribes could enforce in court.170
The bill was referred to the House Committee on Natural Resources and a
hearing was held, but the bill never passed the committee stage.171
3. No Consent
Many Indian governments are less than excited about consultations that
do not have a tribal consent requirement. What is the purpose of taking the
time and effort to study an issue, develop a position, and then have the
federal government give it only modest consideration, if even that?172
Administration officials often realize they do not have to obtain tribal
consent and even have downplayed President Clinton’s 2000 Executive
Order.173
In conclusion, it is probably correct to state that most tribal
governments are not satisfied with the current federal consultation process,
no matter how much it has been emphasized and possibly improved in
recent decades. Indian nations do not believe the federal government is
fulfilling its trust duties towards tribes,174 nor is it giving tribes a real voice
in decisions that vitally affect them and their lands and resources.175 Is
there perhaps a better system for the United States to consult and work with
American Indian nations?
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLE OF FREE, PRIOR, AND
INFORMED CONSENT
Indigenous nations and advocates
great accomplishment when the United
the Declaration on the Rights of
“Declaration”) in September 2007.176

from around the world achieved a
Nations General Assembly adopted
Indigenous Peoples (“DRIP” or
While the effort took nearly thirty

169. Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments Act, H.R. 5608, 110th
Cong. (2008).
170. Testimony, supra note 153, at 5.
171. Id.
172. Haskew, supra note 72, at 28 (“[C]onsultations are ultimately worthless.”).
173. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 159, at 3-4 (statement of Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr., President of
the Navajo Nation)
174. Routel & Holth, supra note 127, at 429-35, 474-75; Haskew, supra note 72, at 29-31.
For a succinct discussion of the trust duty, see COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 412-16.
175. See generally NCAI Letter, supra note 143.
176. Julian Burger, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: From
Advocacy to Implementation, in REFLECTIONS, supra note 151, at 42; JAMES (SA’KE’J)
YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, INDIGENOUS DIPLOMACY AND THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE: ACHIEVING
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years, it still seems almost miraculous that Indigenous nations, Indigenous
peoples and organizations, and their supporters were able to push their way
to the U.N. table, which is after all a nation/state organization, and gain
nearly unanimous support for the DRIP.177
Among its many provisions, the DRIP significantly strengthened the
emerging international law principle that states must consult with
Indigenous nations and peoples in many circumstances and must often even
acquire their informed consent before undertaking state actions that might
impact Indigenous peoples and their rights.178 In this section we undertake
a detailed and original examination of the evolution of FPIC and its
adoption in the DRIP and whether states really must obtain the consent of
Indigenous peoples in certain situations.
A. CREATING THE DECLARATION
In 1972, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities (part of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights)
appointed a Special Rapporteur to study discrimination against Indigenous
peoples.179 Subsequently, a significant U.N. conference for Indigenous
peoples was held in 1977 during which the delegates created a declaration
of principles to defend the rights of Indigenous nations.180 In addition, in
1982 the report that had been ordered in 1972 for the Sub-Commission was
finished.181 In response to the report and the 1977 conference, the SubCommission created a Working Group on Indigenous Populations
(“WGIP”) and assigned it two tasks: (1) to review the promotion and
UN RECOGNITION 10-12, 24 (2008); ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED
NATIONS STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND 102-05 (2007).
177. Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations to the Genesis and Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 74 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009),
http://www.internationalfunders.org/documents/MakingtheDeclarationWork.pdf (the WGIP made
every effort to include Indigenous peoples’ primary aspirations in the Declaration; no other U.N.
human rights instrument has had such direct involvement of the intended beneficiaries); LuisEnrique Chávez, The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Breaking the Impasse: The
Middle Ground, in id. at 97-98; Luis Alfonso de Alba, The Human Rights Council’s Adoption of
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in id. at 111.
178. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’
Rightsover Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the InterAmerican Human Rights System, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 263, 452, 454, 456, 461 (2010-2011);
XANTHAKI, supra note 176, at 255, 284.
179. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 34; Augusto Willemsen Diaz, How Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Reached the UN, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, supra note 177, at 23.
180. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 34; Diaz, supra note 179, at 21-22. Another significant
meeting of Non-Governmental Organizations occurred in 1981 as well as various other meetings.
See id.
181. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 34.
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protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for Indigenous
peoples, and (2) to file a report.182 Five human rights experts from around
the world were selected to be the WGIP.183 The WGIP, however, allowed
Indigenous peoples and organizations to participate fully in its annual
meetings and up to 1000 people attended these meetings, along with many
senior government officials.184
In 1993, after eleven years of annual working sessions, the WGIP
experts and the Indigenous participants reached consensus on a Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.185 In 1994, the U.N. SubCommission approved the text without a vote.186 Many nations/states,
however, were unhappy with the Draft, thus the Sub-Commission requested
a review by the U.N. Secretariat to ensure it was consistent with U.N.
human rights standards.187 The Sub-Commission ultimately adopted the
Draft and sent it to the Commission on Human Rights, although many states
still resisted the Draft and lobbied the Commission not to adopt it.188
Due to the state opposition, in 1995 the Commission took the cautious
route and created an open-ended working group of fifty-three state
representatives, called the Working Group on the Draft Declaration
(“WGDD”), to review the Draft.189 Commentators claim that most states
wanted to rewrite the entire Draft but that Indigenous peoples insisted on no
changes at all.190 Commentators also allege that some states devoted
significant work to revising the Draft and presented elaborate counterproposals to the WGDD each year.191
182. Id. at 41-42, n.110; Diaz, supra note 179, at 22, 26. The WGIP, however, was located
at the lowest level of the UN hierarchy. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 41.
183. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 42.
184. Diaz, supra note 179, at 27; HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 47-48 (stating that at the
first WGIP meeting fourteen Indigenous organizations attended but that by the ninth working
session more than seventy attended with more than 2500 delegates a year attempting to
participate).
185. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 51; Diaz, supra note 179, at 28.
186. Diaz, supra note 179, at 28.
187. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 67.
188. Id. Indigenous representatives insisted on a policy of “no change” to the Draft. de
Alba, supra note 177, at 111.
189. Mauro Barelli, Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory
Solutions?, 13 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 413, 420 (2011) [hereinafter Barelli, Shaping Indigenous
Self-Determination], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1991756 (last visited
July 4, 2014).
190. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 67, 69; Asbjorn Eide, The Indigenous Peoples, The
Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples’, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, supra note 177, at 38; XANTHAKI,
supra note 176, at 104; John B. Henriksen, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples: Some Key Issues and Events in the Process, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK,
supra note 177, at 79.
191. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 70.
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By the end of the U.N. Decade of Indigenous Peoples in 2004,
consensus had been reached on only two of the forty-five articles in the
Draft Declaration!192 As the idea of a second Decade of Indigenous
Peoples was being floated in 2004, the U.N. General Assembly and the
Secretary-General put pressure on the Commission to finish the Draft.193
The WGDD, the state representatives, and the Indigenous representatives
did not reach consensus on a Draft Declaration.194 Instead, in March 2006
the Chairman of the WGDD submitted his final revised proposal for a
Declaration to the U.N. Human Rights Council, which had replaced the
now-defunct Commission on Human Rights. The new Human Rights
Council (“HRC”) adopted the Chairman’s proposal without making any
substantive changes in June 2006 by a vote of thirty states yes, to two states
no (Canada and the Russian Federation), with twelve states abstaining or
absent.195
The HRC Draft Declaration was then expected to be voted on and
ratified by the General Assembly in fall of 2006, but the African Group of
States (allegedly encouraged by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States196) delayed the process.197 After further negotiations and the
addition of nine amendments, the General Assembly adopted the
Declaration on September 13, 2007, by a vote of 143-4 with 11
abstentions.198 All four countries that voted no in 2007 have since stated
their official support for the DRIP.199

192. Id. at 71; Henriksen, supra note 190, at 82.
193. de Alba, supra note 177, at 109-10; HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 72.
194. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 74; Diaz, supra note 179, at 28.
195. Diaz, supra note 179, at 28; Eide, supra note 190, at 39 (stating that the United States,
New Zealand, and Australia officially protested the adoption even though they were not on the
HRC).
196. Barelli, Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination, supra note 189, at 423; de Alba, supra
note 177, at 123, 128; Eide, supra note 190, at 38.
197. Diaz, supra note 179, at 28; Eide, supra note 190, at 38.
198. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights
of Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, Says President,
U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/ga106
12.doc htm (last visited July 5, 2015); Diaz, supra note 179, at 28 (Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and the United States voted no).
199. Australia’s Support of the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, https://www humanrights.gov.au/publications/australiassupport-declaration-rights-indigenous-peoples (last visited July 5, 2015) [hereinafter Australia’s
Support]; Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, http://www mfat.govt nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/HumanRights/Indigenous-Peoples/draftdec-jun07.php (last visited July 5, 2015) [hereinafter NEW
ZEALAND]; Canada’s Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND N. DEV. CANADA (Nov. 12, 2010),
http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142
[hereinafter
Canada’s
Statement of Support]; Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the
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B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FPIC
The exact phrase “free, prior and informed consent” appeared in the
Draft Declaration for the first time after the eleventh working session of the
WGDD in 2005–2006 in the chairman’s March 2006 revised proposal for
the Draft.200 But the idea that Indigenous peoples have the right to consent,
or not, prior to the commencement of state projects and programs that might
affect is not new. This idea seems to have appeared in international law
circles in 1977 when Indigenous peoples, governments, and organizations
became involved in international efforts to protect their rights.
In 1977, the U.N. Economic and Social Council’s Sub-Committee on
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid, and Decolonization held a
conference in Geneva on discrimination against Indigenous populations.201
The sixty or so Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGO”), and up to 400
people in attendance, split into groups to study specific issues and to file
reports and recommendations.
The Social and Cultural Commission for this conference concluded that
Indigenous peoples in the Americas have the right to participate in the
political lives of the countries where they live, and it protested, among other
things, that sterilization operations were conducted on Indigenous peoples
in the “absence of free and informed consent.”202 Moreover, the Economic
Commission for this conference addressed the taking of Indigenous lands
and the exploitation and damage caused to these lands from development
projects that were conducted “without native consultation.”203 And the
Final Resolution adopted by the conference delegates recommended that the
lands of Indigenous peoples “should not be taken, and their land rights
should not be terminated or extinguished without their full and informed

Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2010/12/153027 htm [hereinafter Announcement of U.S. Support].
200. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh Session, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 30, 39, 46, 55-56, 61 (Mar. 22, 2006). The Draft Declaration produced
by the WGIP contained language very similar to FPIC. See, e.g., id. at art. 20 (“States shall obtain
the free and informed consent of the peoples concerned before adopting and implementing such
measures.”). An Indigenous representative used the FPIC phrase during the seventh work session
of the WGDD. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/98, at 9
(Mar. 6, 2002).
201. International Indian Treaty Council, The Geneva Conference (Oct. 1977) (doCip CD
Rom) (on file with author); cf. A Documentary History of the Origin and Development of
Indigenous Peoples Day, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES DAY, http://ipdpowwow.org/Archives1 html (last
visited Aug. 12, 2015).
202. International Indian Treaty Council, supra note 201, at 18.
203. Id. at 14-15.
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consent” and that all governments should engage in “meaningful
negotiations” with Indigenous peoples relative to their lands.204
The delegates also developed a Declaration of Principles, which
included consent provisions. The Principles stated that Indigenous treaties
and agreements should not be subject to unilateral abrogation, no state
should assert a claim over an Indigenous nation except pursuant to
agreements “freely made,” and disputes should be settled by procedures
“mutually acceptable to the parties.”205
1. The Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the Draft
Declaration 1982–1994
As already noted, in 1982 the U.N. Economic and Social Council
authorized the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities to establish a Working Group on Indigenous
Populations (“WGIP”).206 Five independent human rights experts were
appointed to be the WGIP. This group was directed to review current
developments on the rights of Indigenous peoples and to draft standards to
promote and protect these rights.207
The WGIP held annual sessions from 1982 to 1993. In 1982, several
comments were received from WGIP members and Indigenous
representatives that international and national standards concerning
Indigenous peoples should be drafted only after consultations, that policies
on the national recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights should not be
formulated without consultations, and that Indigenous peoples needed to be
consulted on their rights to participate in national development decisions.208
Interestingly, many Indigenous and NGO representatives stated that any
modification of Indigenous peoples’ land rights and development projects
204. Id. at 22-23.
205. Id. at 25-26. In 1981, the same U.N. Sub-Committee organized another conference on
Indigenous peoples. World Federation of Democratic Youth, International NGO Conference on
Indigenous Peoples and the Land (1981). The report of this conference reaffirmed many points
from the 1977 conference, id. at 16, when it stated that the lands of Indigenous peoples “should
not be terminated or extinguished without their full and informed consent.” Id. Some delegates
argued that states that did not have constitutional provisions addressing Indigenous peoples should
enact them, and Indigenous nations and peoples should determine for themselves “in negotiations
with the governments concerned, the scope and language of the constitutional amendments.” Id.
at 15-16.
206. The idea to form a working group was suggested in the Final Resolution of the 1977
Geneva Indigenous conference on discrimination against Indigenous peoples. See International
Indian Treaty Council, supra note 201, at 24.
207. Daes, supra note 177, at 48. Ms. Daes was the Chair of the WGIP during the times
relevant to our discussion.
208. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on
Its First Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/33, at 15-16 (Aug. 25, 1982).
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to be operated within those lands “should be made only with the consent of
the indigenous group concerned and only after a thorough and public
discussion involving those populations had been held.”209 In the 1983
session, several observers repeated that Indigenous peoples should be able
to participate by consultation and consent in all decisions regarding
development projects in their territories or that would have an impact on
them.210
Significantly, in September 1984 the WGIP chairperson, Erica-Irene
Daes from Greece, represented the WGIP at a World Council of Indigenous
Peoples meeting in Panama.211 At this World Council, hundreds of
Indigenous attendees demanded that the U.N. formally recognize and
protect their basic rights and insisted that the U.N. adopt a declaration or a
treaty/convention to accomplish this purpose.212 Ms. Daes participated in
extensive consultations at this 1984 conference, and these efforts led to the
drafting of seventeen principles that she states became the basis for the
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.213 The following
principles relevant to FPIC were developed by consensus at the Panama
conference:
 Indigenous peoples are entitled to participate in the political
life of the state;
 Indigenous peoples have exclusive rights to their traditional
lands and resources, and if these have been taken without
“their free and informed consent” they must be returned;
 no actions may be undertaken which directly or indirectly
result in the destruction of the land, air, water, sea ice, and
other resources of Indigenous peoples “without the free and
informed consent of the indigenous peoples affected”; and
 Indigenous peoples have the right to be “previously consulted
and to authorize” technological and scientific investigations
conducted within their territories.214
In addition, Ms. Daes reports that another “important drafting text”215
was submitted by six Indigenous NGOs at the WGIP fourth working

209. Id. at 20.
210. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on
Its Second Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/22, at 11 (Aug. 23, 1983).
211. Daes, supra note 177, at 49.
212. Id. at 49, 59.
213. Id. at 49.
214. Id.; Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations
on Its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22, annex III (Aug. 27, 1985).
215. Daes, supra note 177, at 51.
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session in 1985.216 The Declaration of Principles presented by these NGOs
states, in relevant part:
 Rights to share and use lands owned by Indigenous nations or
peoples “may be granted by their free and informed consent, as
evidenced in a valid treaty or agreement”;
 No state shall deny the right of Indigenous nations,
communities, or peoples to participate in the life of the state;
 No technological, scientific, or social investigations shall take
place in relation to Indigenous peoples or their lands “without
their prior authorization”; and
 Jurisdictional disputes regarding the territories and institutions
of Indigenous peoples “must be resolved by mutual agreement
or valid treaty.”217
In her opening statement in 1985 to the fourth session of the WGIP,
Ms. Daes expressly stated that these two sets of principles should constitute
the basis for drafting a declaration.218
216. The Indian Law Resource Center, the Four Directions Council, the National Aboriginal
and Islander Legal Service, the National Indian Youth Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference,
and the International Indian Treaty Council. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22, annex
IV (Aug. 27, 1985).
217. Daes, supra note 177, at 51-52.
218. Id. at 53, 59; Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations on Its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22, at 17 (Aug. 27, 1985).
Other international efforts regarding Indigenous rights occurred somewhat parallel to the WGIP.
The International Labour Organization (“ILO”) was in the process of replacing its 1957 treaty
regarding Indigenous peoples in the mid-to-late 1980s and concluded that process in 1989. But
ILO convention 169 only requires states to consult with Indigenous peoples; there is no consent
requirement. No. 169 of 1989 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 (last visited
July 4, 2015). And, it has only been ratified by 20 countries. Monitoring Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples’ Rights Through ILO Conventions, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ednorm/—normes/documents/publication/wcms
126028.pdf. ILO 169 was mentioned during the WGIP work sessions but was generally dismissed
by Indigenous representatives because it did not contain consent requirements. E.g., Comm’n on
Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Fourth Session, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22, at 16 (Aug. 27, 1985); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24, at 25 (Aug. 24, 1988); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, at 12,
26 (Aug. 27, 1990).
In 1987–1991, the World Bank revised its policies regarding Indigenous peoples, but it only
requires consultation with Indigenous peoples and not consent. Mauro Barelli, Free, Prior and
Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
Developments and Challenges Ahead, 16 INT’L J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 7-9 (2012) [hereinafter
Barelli, Free, Prior and Informed Consent], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1991731. But in 2011, the International Finance Corporation, an arm of the World Bank,
adopted a performance standard that requires obtaining FPIC from affected Indigenous peoples
regarding environmental and social sustainability issues. Overview of Performance Standards on

2015]

CONSULTATION OR CONSENT

75

The principles of consultation and consent were strengthened in the
WGIP fifth session in 1987.219
NGO observers and Indigenous
organizations continued to press for mechanisms to require Indigenous
consent for government actions that affected them and for a declaration that
“free and informed consent” in many areas of Indigenous life was an
essential element of their self-determination.220 One NGO proposed that
the WGIP adopt this principle concerning Indigenous participation: “The
right to be informed of any proposed actions which may affect the well
being of any indigenous peoples or communities and to participate in all
related decision-making processes.”221 The WGIP and the Indigenous
participants agreed to draft a declaration, and Daes was assigned the task of
compiling a first draft in line with the comments from the working sessions
held to date and the principles presented by the Indigenous peoples.222
In 1988, Daes presented the first full draft of a declaration at the
WGIP’s sixth session.223 The draft, not surprisingly, included several
provisions on FPIC. For example, the preamble endorsed a call for
Indigenous “participation in and consultation about” development efforts;
article 12 stated that “lands may only be taken away from [Indigenous
peoples] with their free and informed consent as witnessed by a treaty or
agreement.”224 Other articles proclaimed: (1) the Indigenous peoples’ right
Environmental and Social Sustainability, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION 3 (Jan. 1,
2012), http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1ee7038049a79139b845faa8c6a8312a/PS7English
2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. See also Shalanda H. Baker, Why the IFC’s Free, Prior and
Informed Consent Policy Does Not Matter (Yet) to Indigenous Communities Affected by
Development Projects, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 668 (2012).
Furthermore, an Indigenous representative brought to the attention of the Working Group on
the Draft Declaration an interpretation by the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racism and
Discrimination of its standards. This interpretation required states to obtain consent before
making “decisions that directly impact [Indigenous peoples’] rights and interests.” Comm’n on
Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with Comm’n on Human
Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/106, at 7 (Dec. 15, 1997).
219. A 1987 study commissioned by the U.N. Sub-Committee also stated that Indigenous
peoples should be consulted and give “explicit consent” before mining and multinational
corporation activities occur within their territories. José R. Martínez Cobo (Special Rapporteur of
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities), Study of the
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Volume 5, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/sub.2/
1986/7/Add.4, at 41 (1987).
220. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on
Its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/22, at 9, 14 (1987).
221. Id. at 17.
222. Id. at 17; Daes, supra note 177, at 59-60, 63.
223. Daes, supra note 177, at 63; Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations on Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24, annex II at 32-36
(Aug. 24, 1988).
224. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on
Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24, annex II at 32-36 (Aug. 24, 1988); see also
Daes, supra note 177, at 63;
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to reclaim lands and resources “taken away from them without consent”; (2)
a right to protection from pollution of their land, air, water, sea ice, and
other resources caused “without free and informed consent”; (3) that states
have a duty “to seek and obtain their consent” before exploiting mineral
resources in Indigenous territories; (4) a right to consent to state measures
to assist them with social and economic conditions; and (5) a right to
participate fully in the political life of the state and “in decision-making
about and implementation of all national and international matters that may
affect their life and destiny.”225
Throughout the working sessions on the draft declaration, the WGIP
repeatedly requested comments from Indigenous peoples and organizations
and state governments.226 The WGIP also continued to amend and expand
the first draft at its seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth sessions in response to
comments, including many on consultation, both pro and con, from
governments, Indigenous peoples, organizations, and informal drafting
committees.227 After these four years of work sessions, comments on the
first draft, and the drafting of amendments, the WGIP presented what was
expected to be the final draft at its eleventh session in 1993.228 After further
long discussions, including many comments by state observers,229 the
WGIP accepted this document by consensus and submitted it as the
proposed Draft Declaration to the U.N. Sub-Commission.230 In 1994, the
Sub-Commission approved it without a vote and sent it to the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights.231
This Draft Declaration contained several provisions regarding free,
prior, and informed consent. There were at least five provisions that
expressly required the “free and informed consent” of Indigenous peoples

225. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on
Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24, annex II at 32-36 (Aug. 24, 1988).
226. Daes, supra note 177, at 64.
227. The WGIP received many comments from governments and Indigenous peoples on
consultation and consent. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations on Its Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/36, at 13, 20, 2324, 31-33 (1989); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations on Its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, at 8, 14, 19, 24, 26 (1990);
Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Ninth
Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/40, at 10, 13, 33-34, 36 (1991); Comm’n on Human
Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33, at 14, 24, 28, 49 (1992).
228. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on
Its Eleventh Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, at 12 (1993); Daes, supra note 177, at 64.
229. Daes, supra note 177, at 66-72.
230. Id. at 72; Diaz, supra note 179, at 28.
231. Daes, supra note 177, at 73; Diaz, supra note 179, at 28.
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before states could undertake various actions,232 three other articles required
consultations before various state actions could be commenced,233 and at
least two provisions required agreements with Indigenous peoples.234 Once
the Draft moved to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, many states
began to fight it in earnest, and FPIC was one of the most controversial and
primary targets.235
In sum, this Draft Declaration was written by the WGIP with extensive
input from Indigenous peoples and organizations, and, in fact, the WGIP
actively worked to incorporate the desires and goals of Indigenous peoples
into the document.236 States were not as actively involved in the WGIP
232. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, reprinted in
HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 164, art. 10 (allowing no forced removals of Indigenous peoples
without their free and informed consent); id. at art. 12 (stating Indigenous peoples have the right
to restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual properties taken “without their free
and informed consent”); id. at 166 art. 20 (“States shall obtain the free and informed consent of
the [indigenous] peoples” before adopting legislative or administrative measures that may affect
them.); id. at 167 art. 27 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of the[ir] lands . . .
which have been confiscated, used or damaged without their free and informed consent. Where
this is not possible, they have the right to just and fair compensation.”); id. at 168 art. 30 (noting
Indigenous peoples have “the right to require that States obtain their free and informed consent
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands, territories and other resources.”).
233. Id. at 164 art. 13 (noting states shall work “in conjunction with the indigenous peoples”
to protect cultural places); id. at 165 art. 16 (declaring states shall “in consultation with indigenous
peoples” eliminate discrimination); id. at 169 art. 37 (noting states shall, “in consultation with the
indigenous peoples,” adopt national legislation to give effect to the Declaration).
234. Id. at 167 art. 28 (stating military activities cannot take place on indigenous lands
“unless otherwise freely agreed upon”); id. at 169 art. 39 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to
have access to and prompt decision through mutually acceptable and fair procedures for the
resolution of conflicts . . . .”).
235. S.J. ROMBOUTS, HAVING A SAY: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT 15 (2014); Barelli, Free, Prior and Informed Consent,
supra note 218, at 21; Henriksen, supra note 190, at 79 (stating that only three governments were
willing to accept the Draft Declaration without changes); Luis Rodríguez-Pinero, The InterAmerican System and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Mutual
Reinforcement, in REFLECTIONS, supra note 151, at 472 (“FPIC was one of the most controversial
issues in the drafting process at the UN, and some of the States that abstained or voted against the
Declaration actually voiced concern at the affirmation of FPIC understood as a ‘right to veto.’”).
See also Comm’n on Human Rights, Consideration of a Draft United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2, at para. 14 (Oct. 10, 1995)
(stating Argentina objected to article 20 because “the obligation to obtain the consent of the
[indigenous] peoples” would be incompatible with the democratic principles of the Argentine
constitution); Comm’n on Human Rights, Consideration of a Draft United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2/Add.1, at 5, 7-8 (Nov. 13,
1995) (noting Mexico stated article 30 requiring states to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples
before approving projects affecting their lands could violate the Mexican constitution; the United
States said article 20 would have to be narrowed because indigenous communities could not have
“the unqualified right to veto legislative or administrative measures affecting them.”).
236. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on
Its Twelfth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/30, at 28 (Aug. 17, 1994); Erica-Irene Daes,
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Background and Appraisal, in
REFLECTIONS, supra note 151, at 38 (“The members of the WGIP and I made every effort to
incorporate primary indigenous peoples’ aspirations, and also took into account several
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process, but they still offered many comments throughout the long process
and objected to numerous provisions.237 But state resistance to the Draft
became far more vigorous in front of the Commission on Human Rights
after 1994, as the process of creating a declaration to go to a vote in the
U.N. General Assembly took thirteen more years.
2. The Working Group on the Draft Declaration 1995–2006
State opposition to the WGIP Draft Declaration led the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights in 1995 to create an open-ended working
group of states, entitled the Working Group on the Draft Declaration
(“WGDD”), to review the Draft.238 Indigenous peoples had no right to
participate in the WGDD process, although they were fully included
anyway.239 As already mentioned, many states wanted to completely
rewrite the WGIP Draft, but Indigenous peoples and organizations insisted
on no changes being made.240
The eleven year WGDD process resembled a slow motion negotiation
and an attempt by state governments to amend the Draft when the
Indigenous peoples and organizations adamantly refused any changes
whatsoever. Yet, Indigenous peoples and organizations also demanded to
participate fully in informal state-to-state consultations and in the WGDD
plenary debates regarding potential changes.241 The Chairman of the
WGDD expressly recognized the difficulty of the situation, and the WGDD

substantive comments and amendments proposed by various States.”); Barelli, Shaping
Indigenous Self-Determination, supra note 189, at 418, 420; Diaz, supra note 179, at 28 (declaring
that Indigenous peoples were full participants and drafters); Julian Burger, The United Nations
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 209, 210 (1996)
(asserting that essentially it is the outcome of a “partnership between experts and indigenous
peoples.”).
237. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations on Its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, at 25 (Aug. 27, 1990);
Barelli, Free, Prior and Informed Consent, supra note 218, at 19; XANTHAKI, supra note 176, at
102 (“States gradually withdrew from the drafting process, attending in small numbers and often
reluctant to engage in a dialogue on the provisions.”).
238. Barelli, Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination, supra note 189, at 418, 420 (claiming
that states chose not to actively participate in the WGIP so most of the work was performed by the
five experts and Indigenous peoples).
239. Diaz, supra note 179, at 28.
240. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 67, 69; Chávez, supra note 177, at 97, 99-101. In 2000,
the Russian representative stated: “the current text of the draft declaration was not acceptable to
most Governments.” Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/85, at 8
(Feb. 6, 2001).
241. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/84, at 4
(Dec. 6, 1999); Chávez, supra note 177, at 101.
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seems to have slowly massaged the annual meetings and pressured the
states and Indigenous peoples to accept some changes.242
Throughout the eleven years of the WGDD process, states also resisted
the consent provisions in the Draft. In fact, starting at the very first work
session in 1995, several governments stated they could not accept the FPIC
provisions because they created a separate political, legal, and social system
for Indigenous peoples that would discriminate against others, and some
governments objected to the very term “consent.”243 In the second work
session in 1996, many governments began suggesting changes that would
have dramatically limited FPIC. Brazil, for example, suggested that the
FPIC provision in article 20 should be amended to state that “Indigenous
people have the right to participate fully, if they so choose . . . . [and their]
informed opinion shall be expressed freely.”244 Brazil also suggested
changes to articles 27, 28, and 30; although Indigenous peoples should be
active and informed participants in political affairs, Brazil felt states should
only have to “take account of their free and informed opinion in the
approval of any project affecting their lands and their resources.”245
France also opposed these articles because they impacted state
sovereignty and “gave indigenous peoples a right of veto.”246 Other
countries also thought that the FPIC in proposed article 20 gave
“indigenous peoples a right of veto.”247 Even as late as the seventh work
session, the WGDD Chairman summed up the debate on proposed article
10 (forced removals) and said that questions about the meaning of
“consent” remained, and states continued to suggest alternative words such
as “consultation” or “agreement.”248
242. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh
Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 4-5 (Mar. 22, 2006).
243. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/84, at
15 (Jan. 4, 1996).
244. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/102, at 37 (Dec. 10,
1996). Accord id. at 34-36, 46 (stating Canada suggested, and Japan agreed, that articles 19 and 20
be merged and only reflect the principle that Indigenous peoples have “the right to participate
fully in public affairs”; Malaysia also wanted to limit article 20).
245. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 36.
247. Id. at 39; See also Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established
in Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/84,
at para. 93 (Dec. 6, 1999) (noting the New Zealand representative recognized Indigenous peoples
rights but said they must be balanced by the need of governments to own or regulate resources for
all citizens).
248. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/98, at para. 82, annex I
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Several of the FPIC provisions, however, were far less controversial
and many states agreed, for example, that hazardous materials should not be
stored on Indigenous lands and that Indigenous lands should only be taken
“with the free and informed consent of indigenous peoples.”249 And many
states expressed support for FPIC at different times in somewhat limited
fashions.250
Very little progress towards agreement on the exact language of the
Draft was reached in these work sessions, and mostly informal debates and
side consultations occurred. In fact, by the ninth session in 2004, only two
of the forty-five articles in the Draft had been accepted by consensus.251
Consequently, France called on WGDD Chairman Luis-Enrique Chávez to
compile language for the Draft that might be approved by consensus.252
This was itself very controversial because Indigenous representatives were
demanding that no changes be made to the WGIP Draft.253
Mr. Chávez then created what appears to be his first summary of the
proposals suggested to amend and to add new language to the Draft. He
circulated this summary as an annex to his report on the ninth session.254
Pursuant to the proposed changes, he added one new provision of free and
informed consent that was not in the WGIP Draft.255 He of course also
reported the objections of most governments to many of the “free and
informed consent” provisions and their proposals for amendments.256 He
even suggested alternative language to FPIC in regards to forced removals
of Indigenous peoples.257 And for article 20 (now 19 in the DRIP), he
reported a proposal to merge Draft articles 19 and 20, which also removed

at 24 (Mar. 6, 2002). See also Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established
in Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/92,
annex at 21-22 (Jan. 6, 2003) (noting that Australia suggested amending article 30 to delete
consent entirely and only require state consultations).
249. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/92, at para. 37, annex at
23-25 (Jan. 6, 2003) (quoting New Zealand representatives).
250. See id. at paras. 44-46 (showing that in discussing article 30, Canada’s representative
said that “prior informed consent might not be required in all cases”).
251. Henriksen, supra note 190, at 82; HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 71.
252. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/81, at para. 19 (Jan. 7,
2004).
253. MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, supra note 177, at 97, 99, 101.
254. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/81, annex at 20 (Jan. 7,
2004).
255. Id. annex at 25.
256. See, e.g., id. annex at 24.
257. Id. annex at 22.
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the FPIC provision.258 In addition, he reported a proposal to change the
language in article 30 of the Draft from states having a duty to obtain free
and informed consent prior to approving development projects affecting
Indigenous lands to a duty that states only had to “seek their free and
informed consent prior to the approval” of any such project.259 He also
summarized a proposal that would have significantly limited the duty of
states having to obtain consent by merging articles 25–28 and 30 of the
WGIP Draft that addressed several different issues regarding Indigenous
lands and rights, such as the exploitation of minerals and the military use of
their lands.260 These state suggestions would have eviscerated the
application of FPIC.
Before the start of the tenth session, several states demonstrated their
support for limiting FPIC. Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland,
Finland, Iceland, and Sweden filed their edited version of the WGIP
Draft.261 They left in many of the free and informed consent provisions, but
they changed the verb “obtain” into “seek” in articles 20 and 30 (now 19
and 32(2) in the DRIP).262 In another document, submitted on the same
date, these states explained in regards to FPIC that they were trying to
affirm the principle of consent “as far as possible.”263
The tenth session was a split session, and the first part was held
September 13–24, 2004.264 During the break between sessions, on October
14, 2004, the Chairperson filed his second summary of proposals.265 He
again accurately reported the state suggestions to use the word “seek”
instead of “obtain” regarding Indigenous consent in articles 20 and 30, and
to possibly remove FPIC from article 10 on forced removals.266 Also
during the session break, the Indigenous peoples of Scandinavia, the
Saamis, put forward their written proposal for the Draft in which they
258. Id. annex at 24.
259. Id. annex at 26 (emphasis added).
260. Id. annex at 26-27.
261. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group Established in Accordance with Comm’n
on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Information Provided by States, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.1 (Sept. 6, 2004).
262. Id. at 9, 11.
263. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group Established in Accordance with Comm’n
on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Information Provided by States, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.2, at 6-7 (Sept. 6, 2004).
264. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/89, at 5-6 (Feb. 28, 2005).
265. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group Established in Accordance with
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Chairperson’s Summary of Proposals, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.4, at 1 (Oct. 14, 2004).
266. Id. at 17, 28-29, 37-38.
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accepted the use of “seek” over “obtain” in article 20 but rejected “seek” in
article 30 (article 32(2) of the Declaration) because they argued that states
must get FPIC before taking or using the lands and territories of Indigenous
peoples.267
The tenth session was then completed from November 29 to December
3, 2004.268 The Indigenous representatives objected vociferously to the
Chairman’s summary of proposals including the changes suggested to FPIC
and the use of “seek” instead of “obtain” in article 30.269 Indigenous
peoples insisted on the return of FPIC language and some even staged a
hunger strike and engaged in other protest efforts because of the proposed
changes.270 In a list of the most important issues compiled by Indigenous
peoples regarding the Chairman’s summary, they stated: “The principles of
prior informed consent and full collaboration with affected indigenous
peoples must be applied for the effective implementation by States of the
provisions throughout the declaration.”271 Obviously no consensus could
be reached on the proposed changes to the WGIP Draft after lessening state
consent obligations.272 Throughout the tenth work session, a facilitator was
used to conduct discussions. The facilitator strongly suggested that the
Chairman delete “seek” from articles 20 and 30 and return to “the verb
obtain.”273
Also during the tenth session, the Chair stated that for the first time he
would submit a Chairman’s proposal for the entire Draft Declaration, not

267. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group Established in Accordance with
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Information Provided by the Saami Council
and the Tebtebba Foundation, Endorsed by the Saami Parliamentarian Council, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.5, at 12, 15 (Oct. 28, 2004).
268. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group Established in Accordance with Comm’n
on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Chairperson’s Summary of Proposals, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.4, at 1 (Oct. 14, 2004).
269. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/89, at para. 35 (Feb. 28, 2005).
270. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 199/32 of 3 March 1995, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/
89/Add.1, at 4-5, 8 (Feb. 24, 2005) (displaying written comments submitted by Indigenous
organizations after end of the tenth session). See also Adelfo Regino Montes & Gustavo Torres
Cisneros, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Foundation
of a New Relationship Between Indigenous Peoples, States and Societies, in MAKING THE
DECLARATION WORK, supra note 177, at 143.
271. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 199/32 of 3 March 1995, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/89/
Add.1, at 8 (Feb. 24, 2005).
272. Comm. on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 on Its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/89,
at 7 (Feb. 28, 2005).
273. Id. at 7.
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just a summary of the proposals of the states and Indigenous
representatives.274 Chairman Chávez released his proposal on April 1,
2005.275 In the two most controversial FPIC articles, he used the verb
“obtain” regarding consent in article 30, but for article 20, which concerned
states obtaining FPIC before enacting legislative and administrative
measures that may affect Indigenous peoples, he only required states to
“seek” their consent and did not require states to “obtain” consent.276
During this ten year process from 1995–2005, the United Nations
Decade of Indigenous Peoples had come to an end and the continued
existence of the WGDD was in question.277 In fact, the WGDD was
ultimately authorized to work only one more year on the Draft
Declaration.278 Thus, the WGDD met for its final time in its eleventh
session from December 5–16, 2005, and January 30 to February 3, 2006, to
discuss the Chairman’s April 2005 proposal for the Draft.279
From the very opening of the session, Chairman Chávez put pressure
on the state and Indigenous representatives.280 He emphasized that this was
the last meeting of the WGDD and thus the participants had to be flexible
and conciliatory because they had to make clear progress towards creating a
text that could be adopted by consensus.281 He also wanted the text to be as
close as possible to the WGIP Draft, but it also had to include the proposed
amendments that seemed necessary.282 Not surprisingly, at the end of the
eleventh session, consensus was not reached on the Draft.283 Consequently,
the Chair stated he would revise the proposals he presented after the tenth
session, include all the language provided by the eleventh session
facilitators, and make his own proposals regarding the articles still pending
based on the session discussions.284
274. Id.
275. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/89/Add.2, at 1 (Apr. 1, 2005).
276. Id. at 28, 41. See also id. at 17 (noting the Chair proposed that FPIC was required in
article 10 for forced removals).
277. See Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance
with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh Session,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 4 (Mar. 22, 2006).
278. Montes & Cisneros, supra note 270, at 143.
279. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh Session, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 4 (Mar. 22, 2006).
280. Id. at 4.
281. Id. at 4-5.
282. See id. at 5.
283. Id. at 7.
284. Id.
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Both Indigenous and state representatives were very concerned about
the lack of consensus on many articles.285 The Chair responded that he
would present the “revised Chairman’s proposals” to the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights “with the hope that it would be considered as a final
compromise text.”286 He completed his revised proposal quickly and
submitted it on March 22, 2006, along with his final report on the eleventh
session.287 The Chair’s proposal was adopted without any substantive
changes by the U.N. Human Rights Council in June 2006.288
Since the Chair’s revised proposal was adopted as the HRC Draft
Declaration, it is especially useful in regards to FPIC to compare his
proposal with the Draft of the WGIP. First, the Chairman retained most if
not all of the FPIC provisions from the WGIP Draft, and in fact he even
added two new FPIC requirements and numerous other provisions requiring
states to consult, cooperate, enter agreements, or act in conjunction with
Indigenous peoples.289 He also used in his proposal, apparently for the first
time used by anyone in written form, the exact phrase “free, prior and
informed consent.”290
Second, he also retained FPIC in the most controversial articles, 20 and
30 (now 19 and 32(2) of the Declaration).291 He ignored the state proposals
to use the conditional word “seek” instead of the mandatory word to
“obtain” FPIC.292 However, the Chair did make some unilateral and very
significant changes to these two articles that perhaps served state
interests.293 In articles 20 and 30, which require states to “obtain” the free
and informed consent of Indigenous peoples before enacting legislative or
administrative measures that may affect them, and before approving
development projects affecting their lands and territories, the Chair added

285. Id.
286. Id.; Chávez, supra note 177, at 102. The Chair’s hopes were realized because his
proposal was accepted without any substantive changes as the Draft Declaration by the Human
Rights Council, which had replaced the Commission on Human Rights.
287. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh Session, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 8-77 (Mar. 22, 2006).
288. See Chávez, supra note 177, at 105.
289. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh
Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 39 (Mar. 22, 2006) (article 12); id. at 42 (article 15 in
which the Chair added “in conjunction with”); id. at 43 (article 16 in which the Chair added
“consultation and cooperation”); id. at 48-49 (article 22); id. at 53 (article 26); id. at 56 (article 28
in which the Chair added FPIC); see also id. at 40, 59, 67, 70.
290. See, e.g., id. at 30 (article 10); id. at 46 (article 20); id. at 61 (article 30).
291. Id. at 40, 61.
292. Id. at 46.
293. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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this identical wording in both articles: “States shall consult and cooperate in
good faith with the indigenous peoples . . . in order to obtain their” FPIC.294
Chairman Chávez interprets this language as only requiring states to use a
mandatory procedure—consultation and cooperation in an attempt to obtain
consent— but not as a requirement to actually obtain consent.295
3. The Draft Declaration in the Human Rights Council and
General Assembly 2006–07
In 2006, the Commission on Human Rights was abolished and a new
entity, the U.N. Human Rights Council, was created.296 During its very
first session, on June 29, 2006, the Council adopted without any substantive
changes Chairman Chávez’s March 22, 2006, revised proposal as the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.297 The HRC Draft was
not adopted by consensus, but the state representatives on the HRC voted
for Mr. Chávez’s proposal thirty yes, two no (Canada and the Russian
Federation), with twelve abstentions.298
With this vote, it appeared a foregone conclusion that the U.N. General
Assembly would also adopt the Draft in fall of 2006. However, the few
states actively opposing the Draft continued to fight, and apparently they
enlisted the African Group of nations to help put a stop to a General
Assembly vote in 2006.299 Primarily led by Namibia, the African Group
had seven objections to the Draft, including that FPIC might give
Indigenous peoples a veto power over state actions.300 The African nations
ultimately offered more than thirty-five amendments to the HRC Draft

294. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh Session, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 46 (Mar. 22, 2006) (article 20); id at 61 (article 30).
295. See infra text accompanying notes 331-37.
296. de Alba, supra note 177, at 108, 117. The creation of the Council elevated human rights
issues in the United Nations hierarchy because the HRC reports directly to the General Assembly.
Id. at 108, 117.
297. de Alba, supra note 177, at 108-09, 121-124. See also Human Rights Council
Resolution 2006/2, (June 29, 2006), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration
.aspx.
298. de Alba, supra note 177, at 108. The HRC has a limited number of representatives that
serve set terms. Of the states with representatives on the Council in 2006, only Canada and the
Russian Federation voted no. Id. Canada filed a statement explaining its no vote and cited the
FPIC provisions in particular. Ambassador Paul Meyer, Statement to the First Session of the
Human Rights Council (June 29, 2006), http://www.docip.org/greenstone/collect/cendocdo/index/
assoc/HASH1009/f057ac98.dir/5.Canada.
299. See de Alba, supra note 177, at 122-23, 125. As already mentioned, many scholars
report that the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand actively encouraged African
nations to object. Id. at 122-23; see also supra note 196 and accompanying text.
300. Albert K. Barume, Responding to the Concerns of the African States, in MAKING THE
DECLARATION WORK, supra note 177, at 170-72; see de Alba, supra note 177, at 126-27.
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between April and May of 2007, but these changes were refused by
Indigenous peoples and organizations and by the states that supported the
HRC Draft.301 Also, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States filed
joint objections that the Draft process had been deeply flawed, was
finalized without agreement or consensus, provided for possible secession
by Indigenous peoples and nations, and created different categories of
citizens due to the FPIC provisions.302 These arguments were identical to
those being made by the African Group of nations.303
Thereafter, the President of the U.N. General Assembly appointed the
Philippine U.N. representative to negotiate this impasse, and after intense
negotiations and lobbying, the African objectors, the state sponsors of the
HRC Draft, and Indigenous representatives accepted nine amendments to
the Draft, none of which concerned the FPIC provisions.304 The U.N.
General Assembly then voted to adopt the HRC Draft as the U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on September 13, 2007,
the last day of the United Nation’s 61st session.305 The only four countries
to vote no, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States,
explained their reasons, which included the FPIC provision in article 19
(article 20 in the Draft).306 As already mentioned, however, all four of
these countries have since officially endorsed the Declaration.307

301. Barume, supra note 300, at 172; de Alba, supra note 177, at 127-29.
302. de Alba, supra note 177, at 129 n.37. As late as August 13, 2007, Canada, Colombia,
New Zealand, and the Russian Federation sent the U.N. General Assembly President thirty-four
proposed amendments, including to some of the FPIC provisions. Id. at 131.
303. de Alba, supra note 177, at 129 n.37.
304. Barume, supra note 300, at 178-79; Montes & Cisneros, supra note 270, at 150-51; de
Alba, supra note 177, at 108, 129-32.
305. Montes & Cisneros, supra note 270, at 151. See also de Alba, supra note 177, at 108,
132 (noting that the DRIP was adopted by a vote of the U.N. General Assembly, 143 – 4, with 11
abstentions).
306. United States Press Release # 204, September 13, 2007 (the U.S. objected that the HRC
Draft had not been before the WGDD but was prepared and submitted after the last working
session concluded, states had had no opportunity to discuss it, the HRC allegedly did not respond
to U.S. calls to work on a consensus text, and because of the splintered vote (30-2)). The
following four documents are available at http://www.docip.org/Online-Documentation.32.0.html
(last visited July 27, 2015): Observations of the U.S. with Respect to the Declaration, at 2 (naming
specifically Article 19 as possibly conferring a veto power over domestic laws to a sub-national
group); Explanation of Vote by the Hon. Robert Hill Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of Australia, at 3 (“Australia has concerns that the Declaration expands any right to free, prior and
informed consent too far.”); Statement by Ambassador John McNee Permanent Representative of
Canada, at 3 (stating that the FPIC provisions “are unduly restrictive” and Article 19 might
prevent states from enacting legislative or administrative matters); Explanation of Vote by New
Zealand Permanent Representative H E Ms. Rosemary Banks, at 2 (“[F]our provisions in the
Declaration are fundamentally incompatible with New Zealand’s constitutional and legal
arrangements . . . articles 19 and 32 on a right of veto over the State.”). Accord U.N. GAOR, 61st
Sess., 107th plen. mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13 2007) (Australia voted no because
of FPIC and an Indigenous veto); id. at 12-13 (Canada voted no because of FPIC, Article 19, and
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C. WHEN DOES THE DECLARATION REALLY REQUIRE PRIOR
CONSENT?
The U.N. Declaration contains many provisions that require states in
certain situations to enter agreements with Indigenous peoples,308 to engage
in consultations and to cooperate with Indigenous peoples,309 to work in
conjunction and cooperation with Indigenous peoples,310 and to obtain the
free, prior, and informed consent of Indigenous peoples.311 Most of these
provisions are not controversial, at least not in the United States where
Indian nations have government-to-government political relationships with
the United States, the U.S. owes them a fiduciary trust duty, and tribes and
Indians own their lands and other property rights as recognized in treaties,

an Indigenous veto); id. at 14 (New Zealand voted no because of FPIC, Article 19, and an
Indigenous veto).
307. Australia’s Support, supra note 199; NEW ZEALAND, supra note 199; Canada’s
Statement of Support, supra note 199; Announcement of U.S. Support, supra note 199. See also
DWIGHT G. NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 150 (2014)
(stating that each endorsement came with an interpretive statement to limit the legal effects of the
endorsement; Canada, for example, said that the DRIP is only aspirational, not legally binding,
and does not reflect customary international law).
308. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 154 art. 18 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to
participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights . . . .”); id. at 155 art. 23
(“Indigenous peoples have the right to be actively involved in developing and determining health,
housing and other economic and social programmes affecting them . . . .”); id. at 156 art. 30(1)
(stating no military activities can occur in Indigenous peoples’ lands or territories unless freely
agreed upon).
309. Id. at 154 art. 17(2) (“States shall in consultation and co-operation with indigenous
peoples take specific measures to protect indigenous children from economic exploitation . . . .”);
id at 156 art. 30(2) (noting states shall consult with Indigenous peoples “prior to using their lands
or territories for military activities”); id. at 157 art. 36(2) (“States, in consultation and co-operation
with indigenous peoples, shall take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and
implementation of” Indigenous peoples’ rights to maintaining contact and activities across
international borders.); id. at 158 art. 38 (“States, in consultation and co-operation with indigenous
peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of
this Declaration.”).
310. Id. at 153 art. 12 (declaring that states shall develop effective mechanisms in
conjunction with Indigenous peoples for their access to, and repatriation of, ceremonial objects
and human remains); id. at art. 14(3) (“States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take
effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children . . . to have access,
when possible, to an education in their own culture and provided in their own language.”); id. at
art. 15(2) (“States shall take effective measures, in consultation and co-operation with the
indigenous peoples concerned, to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination . . . .”); id. at 155
art. 22(2) (“States shall take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure that
indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all forms of
violence and discrimination.”); id. at 156 art. 27 (“States shall establish and implement, in
conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and
transparent process . . . to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to
their lands, territories, and resources . . . .”); id. at 157 art. 31(2) (“In conjunction with indigenous
peoples, States shall take effective measures to recognize and protect” Indigenous peoples’
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, sciences, technology, and cultures.).
311. Id. at 152-54, 156-57 arts. 10, 11(2), 19, 28(1), 29(2), 32(2).
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federal statutes, and/or court orders.312 During the WGDD process, many
states noted that when Indigenous peoples own land and property rights,
they often should have the right to consent, or not, to state actions that
might harm or affect those rights.313 In this section, we will focus on the
six FPIC provisions that purport to require states to secure the free, prior,
and informed consent of Indigenous peoples in certain situations.
As a preliminary matter, however, we must note that the DRIP is not
yet considered binding international law. The United States, Canada, New
Zealand, and Australia all made that point abundantly clear when they
issued their statements of support for the Declaration after initially voting
against it in 2007.314 The DRIP is a U.N. General Assembly resolution and
is not the equivalent of treaties and U.N. conventions that states ratify and
agree to abide by.315 Thus, the Declaration is not a legally binding
document but, as some say, it is only aspirational.316 But another way to
view the DRIP is that it represents what was already accepted international
law regarding Indigenous nations and peoples. The fact that the U.N. voted
143-4 in favor of the DRIP is some evidence, maybe even persuasive
evidence, that nation/states viewed the Indigenous rights and state duties
explicated in the Declaration to already be established international law.
That possibility is very significant under what can be called the
common law of international law, opinio juris. Under opinio juris, when
states act in a certain fashion because they think it is required of them under
international law, they are in effect creating and solidifying international
law because they are acting according to standards that they think are

312. See, e.g., COHEN’s, supra note 31, at 412-16, 993-1318; Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S.
234, 242-43 (1997) (holding the federal government cannot take individual Indians’ property
without paying compensation); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 236-37 (1983) (holding
that an individual Indian can sue the U.S. for money damages for breach of trust in managing her
timber); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658,
707 (1979) (declaring signatory tribes own treaty-recognized property rights in salmon); Arizona
v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 644-45 (1963) (holding that five tribes own an enormous quantity of
Colorado River water); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968)
(noting the tribe retained property rights for hunting based in treaty, even though terminated from
federal recognition); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (U.S. trust
responsibility).
313. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/92, at 10-11,
23-25, (Jan. 6, 2003) (citing the New Zealand, Canadian, and Norwegian representatives).
314. See supra notes 199, 307, and accompanying text.
315. NEWMAN, supra note 307, at 149 (General Assembly resolutions do not have inherent
legal force).
316. Id. at 150; Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous
Peoples’ Participation Rights Within International Law, 10 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS 54, para. 12
(2011).
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legally required of them.317 Some commentators argue that in 2007 the
DRIP represented established international law requirements,318 including
the U.N. Special Rapporteur James Anaya,319 and thus perhaps it is itself
binding international law pursuant to opinio juris. With those thoughts in
mind, let us turn to the six FPIC provisions.
First, article 10 forbids the forcible relocation of Indigenous peoples
from their lands or territories without their consent and mandates that
removals can only occur after agreements are reached on fair
compensation.320 There seems to be nothing controversial about that point
although there were proposals in the WGDD to drop the FPIC provision in
regards to removals.321 But in 2007, forced removals of peoples were
already considered illegal under international law and might even be
defined as genocide under a 1948 United Nations convention.322 Moreover,

317. See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 307, at 144-45, 153 (noting “the obligation to consult . .
. is also a general principle of international law” and Canada now has a duty to consult with
Indigenous peoples as part of developing international law). A U.N. General Assembly resolution
can describe customary international law. Id. at 149. But see Ward, supra note 316, at para. 86
(noting FPIC is not customary international law yet, but a customary minimal norm of
consultation with Indigenous peoples has crystallized).
318. See, e.g., Montes & Cisneros, supra note 270, at 155 (arguing that the DRIP did not
necessarily create new rights, but instead just repeated and re-affirmed already existing rights,
which had already become recognized in international law); ROMBOUTS, supra note 235, at 88
(arguing that the U.N. had already approved FPIC in 2005 when it stated its objectives for a
second decade of the world’s Indigenous peoples: “To promote the full and effective participation
of indigenous peoples in decisions which directly or indirectly affect their lifestyles, traditional
lands and territories, their cultural integrity as indigenous peoples with collective rights, or any
other aspects of their lives, considering the principle of free, prior and informed consent.”
(quoting U.N. GA, Draft Programme of Action for the Second International Decade of the
World’s Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. A/60/270, at 4 (Aug. 18, 2005)); Stefania Errico, The
Controversial Issue of Natural Resources: Balancing States’ Sovereignty with Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights, in REFLECTIONS, supra note 151, at 357-58 (quoting the World Bank’s legal
department as saying that consultation with, and the participation of, Indigenous peoples in
decisions affecting them is an “emerging principles of international law” (citing Legal Note on
Indigenous Peoples, para. 28 Apr. 8, 2005, www.worldbank.org/indigenous (last visited July 7,
2015))).
319. James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of Indigenous People), Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/12/34, at 12 (July 15, 2009) (“[T]he duty of States to consult with indigenous peoples . . .
is firmly rooted in international human rights law.”).
320. G.A. Res. 61/295 (X) (Sept. 13, 2007).
321. See supra notes 248, 257, 266, and accompanying text.
322. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 3 (1948),
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf;
Office of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 1, http://www.un.org/en/prevent
genocide/adviser/pdf/osapganalysisframework.pdf. One group says that removals can meet the
U.N. definition of genocide if a removal imposes conditions of life on an ethnic or racial group
with the intent to destroy them in whole or in part. The Legal Definition of Genocide, PREVENT
GENOCIDE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/officialtext-printerfriendly
htm (last visited August 10, 2015).
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this same idea has been reflected in United States law since colonial times
and was expressly stated in the Removal Act of 1830.323 Furthermore,
article 28(1) provides a right of redress for Indigenous peoples, which can
include restitution of lands or monetary relief, for any of their lands,
territories, or resources that are taken, occupied, or damaged without their
free, prior and informed consent.324 And, unless Indigenous peoples “freely
agree[]” otherwise, compensation must include providing other lands of
comparable value.325 This provision also seems to match United States law
regarding American Indian nations.326
In addition, article 11(2) requires states to provide redress through
mechanisms developed “in conjunction” with Indigenous peoples regarding
any of their cultural, intellectual, religious, or spiritual property rights that
have been taken without FPIC. United States law already protects many of
these same issues for American Indians and tribes.327
Furthermore, article 29(2) prohibits the storage or disposal of
hazardous waste on the lands or territories of Indigenous peoples without
their free, prior, and informed consent.328 This provision does not seem
surprising if Indigenous peoples own the lands at issue. In the United
States, however, despite this seemingly obvious tenet, and despite U.S.
obligations to Indian nations, the federal government has been fairly
accused of using Indian lands as “national sacrifice areas” over the past two
centuries to the extreme detriment of tribes and Indian communities.329
The controlling factor under these four FPIC provisions seems to be
that if Indigenous nations or peoples own specific lands, rights, or

323. See Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830); see supra text accompanying note 52.
Removals of American Indians were mostly performed pursuant to alleged consent demonstrated
in subsequent treaties. Cf. 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 27, at 145, 162 (Treaty with the
Wyandot, Etc., 1817, art. 6, 7 Stat. 160 and Treaty with the Wyandot, Etc., 1818, art. 1, 7 Stat.
178).
324. G.A. Res. 61/295, Art. 28(1) (Sept. 13, 2007).
325. Id.
326. See, e.g., supra note 312; PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 1017-23
(describing the Indian Claims Commission process created by Congress to compensate tribes for
lands illegally taken); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 423-24 (1980).
327. See, e.g., Robert J. Miller, American Indian and Tribal Intellectual Property Rights, 13
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 179, 179 (2010); PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 93234, 973-76 (discussing the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1934); see Exec. Order No. 13,007, supra
note 104 (sacred sites); 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq. (Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act of 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (American Indian Religious Freedom Act); 25 U.S.C.
§ 2901 (Native American Language Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (protecting Indian religious use of
peyote); COHEN’s, supra note 31, at 1265-318 (discussing a wide range of Indian rights).
328. G.A. Res. 61/295 Art. 29(2) (Sept. 13, 2007).
329. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”, supra note 4, at 55; Jana L. Walker, Jennifer L.
Bradley & Timothy J. Humphrey, Sr., A Closer Look at Environmental Injustice in Indian
Country, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 379, 386-91 (2002).
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resources, then states cannot take or adversely affect those property rights
without prior consent.330 That seems to be a perfectly reasonable legal
requirement. Consequently, states, and the United States, must obtain the
FPIC of Indigenous peoples and Indian nations before engaging in the
activities or creating the situations defined in articles 10, 11(2), 28(1), and
29(2). And it seems imminently reasonable that American Indian nations
and Indigenous peoples have the FPIC option to say “no” in these
circumstances.
In sharp contrast, however, two of the FPIC provisions were far more
controversial during the Declaration drafting process; article 19 is
especially so. Article 19 states: “States shall consult and co-operate in
good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own
representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed
consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative
measures that may affect them.”331 And article 32(2) states:
States shall consult and co-operate in good faith with the
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior
to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories
and other resources, particularly in connection with the
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other
resources.332
The Chairperson of the WGDD from 1999–2006, Luis-Enrique
Chávez, added the italicized language to articles 20 and 30 (articles 19 and
32(2) in the DRIP) in his March 2006 Chairman’s revised proposal for the
WGDD Draft. As mentioned, the HRC adopted his revised proposal in
June 2006 as the HRC Draft Declaration without making any substantive
changes. And the U.N. General Assembly adopted it as the Declaration

330. The role of eminent domain and the United States’ sovereign power to take private
property for “public use” on reservations, to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaty rights, and the
plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs are beyond the scope of this article. See U.S.
CONST. amend V; COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 1050, 1053, 1057-58; United States v. Dion, 476
U.S. 734, 746 (1986); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
331. G.A. Res. 61/295 (XIX) (Sept. 13, 2007) (emphases added), as reprinted in
HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 154. Article 19 of the Declaration was article 20 in the WGIP
Draft Declaration and throughout the WGDD and HRC processes. Article 20 stated in relevant
part: “States shall obtain the free and informed consent . . . .” Id. at 166.
332. Id. at 157 (emphases added). This article of the Declaration was article 30 in the WGIP
Draft and as used throughout the WGDD and HRC processes. Article 30 stated in relevant part:
“Indigenous people have the right . . . to require that States obtain their free and informed consent
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands . . . .” Id. at 168.
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without making any changes to the FPIC provisions. Thus, he literally had
the last word on the drafting of those two provisions.
Mr. Chávez has expressly stated that he drafted these provisions as he
did to avoid creating an Indigenous veto power. In a 2009 book chapter, he
wrote that one of the most sensitive, hot button issues in the entire WGDD
process was FPIC because “it was a question of establishing whether the
declaration could recognise a right of veto in relation to state action or
not.”333 In his opinion, “the WGDD could not accept this.”334 He felt that
states could not renounce their powers or responsibilities to make decisions
on issues of public order and that the Declaration could never recognize
greater rights for Indigenous peoples than for other members of society.335
Thus, he amended these articles to defeat any idea of an FPIC veto right.
He also stated: “The Chairman’s proposals therefore established only
an obligation regarding the means (consultation and cooperation in good
faith with a view to obtaining consent) but not, in any way, an obligation
regarding the result, which would mean having to obtain that consent.”336
Consequently, he dispensed with the idea of a state obligation from the
WGIP Draft to “obtain” the consent of Indigenous peoples in articles 20
and 30, and created only a mandatory process “in order to [attempt to]
obtain their” consent in what became articles 19 and 32(2) of the DRIP. 337
Mr. Chávez must have accomplished his goal because it seems that no
commentator reads FPIC, at least in article 19, to have created an
Indigenous veto power over state actions.338 Even James Anaya, who was
the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2009–
2014, stated in an official U.N. report that article 19 “should not be
333. Chávez, supra note 177, at 103.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 103-04.
337. Id.
338. Barelli, Free, Prior and Informed Consent, supra note 218, at 3 (noting that article 19
“should be intended as a process of which consultation and participation represent the central
pillars”); id. at 16 (stating that human rights treaty bodies have dealt with FPIC “[t]o different
degrees, [but] they have all accepted that FPIC cannot be understood in strict terms.”); NEWMAN,
supra note 307, at 64, 172 (noting article 19 cannot be read strictly because “one effect would be
to alter democratic institutions in ways that may generate further democratic deficits” and “courts
and policy-makers [have to] continue to ensure that the duty to consult fulfills its purposes as a
procedure but does not become an effective veto power, which it is not meant to be”); ROMBOUTS,
supra note 235, at 87 (“FPIC should not be seen as a veto power but that the concept’s general
aim is to fully integrate indigenous peoples into decision-making processes that affect them.”). It
does seem obvious for article 19 that no democratic society could function under an Indigenous
veto power over the enactment of legislative and administrative measures. The DRIP itself states
pretty clearly that it cannot be read as a veto power: “The provisions set forth in this Declaration
shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human
rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith.” G.A. Res. 61/295 (XLVI)
(Sept. 13, 2007).
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regarded as according indigenous peoples a general ‘veto power’ over
decisions that may affect them, but rather as establishing consent as the
objective of consultations.”339 At least one commentator has noted that Mr.
Anaya retreated in this statement from positions he had taken in his earlier
writings.340
It is extremely interesting, though, that the DRIP article 19 was
apparently read, in sharp contrast to Mr. Chávez’ comments, as recognizing
an Indigenous veto power by the four countries that voted against the
Declaration in the U.N. General Assembly. Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States all specifically cited article 19 and its veto
power for Indigenous peoples as one of the four reasons they voted against
the DRIP.341 (Perhaps this claim was just a “democratic” smoke screen to
cover other reasons these countries really voted against the DRIP?).
Moreover, throughout the WGIP, WGDD, HRC Draft, and U.N. General
Assembly processes, many states vehemently objected to these articles
because they allegedly created a veto power for Indigenous peoples over the
legislative and administrative powers of states, and over the approval of
development projects in Indigenous lands.
States made countless
suggestions to amend those articles.
Notwithstanding Chairman Chávez’s 2009 statements, and the
interpretation almost everyone gives articles 19 and 32(2), is it possible that
the articles require states to consult with Indigenous peoples, “so as to” or
“in order to” obtain their consent? What does “in order to” really mean in
those articles? Is it possible that the phrase means that states shall use the
defined process—consulting and cooperating with Indigenous peoples—
and that states “shall” obtain FPIC?
In sum, it appears fairly certain that the FPIC provisions in articles 10,
11(1), 28(1), and 29 are not controversial because they entail property and
human rights that Indigenous peoples own and possess. In addition, it is
clear these articles mandate States, including the United States, to obtain

339. James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of Indigenous People), Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/12/34, at para. 46 (July 15, 2009).
340. Dwight G. Newman, Norms of Consultation with Indigenous Peoples: Decentralization
of International Law Formation or Reinforcement of States’ Role?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE NEW AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 272 (Andrew Byrnes et al. eds., 2013) (claiming that Anaya
argued in his scholarly work for a broader application of FPIC than in this new analysis as the
Special Rapporteur; Anaya “opts for the more limited conception of consultation envisioned by
one side within the ongoing scholarly debate on this issue and thus somewhat moves back from
his own past position.”). See also ROMBOUTS, supra note 235, at 171 (noting that in his 2009
report, Anaya argued that article 19 should not be regarded as a veto right).
341. See supra note 306.
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Indigenous peoples’ consent before undertaking the actions defined in those
articles. For some reason, though, article 32(2) was controversial even
though it also concerns lands or resources owned by Indigenous peoples.
States were no doubt very leery of Indigenous peoples stalling economic
development activities on and off lands they actually own. And it must be
remembered that worldwide many Indigenous peoples’ lands are not yet
demarcated, and their rights are not well-defined under domestic laws.
Thus, states must have been worried about exactly what lands and rights
might be protected in 32(2).
But based on the WGDD Chairman’s explanation of the changes he
made to that article from the WGIP Draft Declaration, and the opinion of
almost all commentators, article 32(2) does not require states to obtain
consent but only to engage in a mandatory consultation and cooperation
procedure “in order to” obtain consent. Finally, there also seems to be no
controversy, according to Chávez and all the commentators, that article 19
does not require states to obtain consent from Indigenous peoples before
enacting administrative and legislative measures that might impact them.
Once again, states are only required to engage in mandatory good faith
consultations and cooperation “in order to” obtain the consent of
Indigenous peoples.
V. CONCLUSION
The principle that Indigenous peoples have the right to free, prior, and
informed consent, or not to consent, to matters that affect their property
rights and lands will continue to be a serious, ongoing, and evolving issue
in the international arena.342 In fact, a wide array of international
conventions, organizations, and courts now require at least meaningful
consultations with Indigenous peoples and often require their prior
consent.343 A few countries have codified consultation and consent
requirements in their constitutions and laws.344 And even private interests
are voluntarily or involuntarily getting involved in FPIC issues.345 In
342. NEWMAN, supra note 307, at 13, 164 (stating FPIC is the future direction of aboriginal
law and relations).
343. See, e.g., ROMBOUTS, supra note 235, at 190-215; Aurelio Cal, et al. v. Attorney
General of Belize, Supreme Court of Belize (Claims No. 171 and 172) (Oct. 18, 2007), paras. 119,
123, 126, 130-32 (holding that Belize, as part of the international community and a subscriber to
some international humanitarian treaties, had a duty to recognize Mayan customary land tenure
rights and to abstain from affecting the property at issue, occupied and used by the Maya people,
unless pursuant to their informed consent).
344. NEWMAN, supra note 307, at 159-61 (citing Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru).
345. See generally, e.g., We Want to Talk: Resolution Copper Breaks Silence Over Land
Swap, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, June 17, 2015, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
2015/06/17/we-want-talk-resolution-copper-breaks-silence-over-land-swap-160750 (last visited
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addition, in 2011 the International Finance Corporation, which is a part of
the World Bank, adopted a performance standard that requires entities that
are using its funding to obtain FPIC from the Indigenous peoples regarding
environmental and social sustainability issues raised by their projects.346
The United States will of course also be faced with decisions on how to
respond to this evolving issue.
I view the FPIC issue in the United States from five different
viewpoints: (1) through the lens of the United States fairly consistent
practice of dealing with Indian nations via consensual, diplomatic, and
political means; (2) with the understanding that American Indian nations
and Indian peoples own lands and various property rights that properly raise
FPIC issues; (3) with the backdrop that the United States has a fiduciary
trust responsibility for Indian nations and Indian peoples; (4) from a
practical angle, it appears easier and less expensive for the United States to
deal with Indian nations in this modern-day on an FPIC basis; and (5) that
article 19 of the Declaration should never be read as an Indigenous veto
over democratic principles. I conclude that viewed from these vantage
points, FPIC is not such a new or alarming idea for the United States, and it
is not that much of a change in the context of Indian nations and the U.S.
First, as discussed in Parts II and III, the history and the generally
accepted practice in the United States has been to deal with tribal nations on
a consensual treaty, diplomatic, and political basis. I am well aware that
Indian nations and Indian peoples suffered greatly under federal policies
and laws and American “Manifest Destiny.”347 I am not holding the United
States up as some kind of utopian model for its dealings with Indigenous
peoples. In fact, many commentators and historians have accurately argued
that the United States pursued genocidal policies against Indian peoples.348
But the practices and laws that the United States claimed to utilize vis-à-vis
Indian nations for the past two hundred plus years does not appear to differ
that much from what is required under FPIC principles. The modern-day
June 29, 2015) (company seeking to consult with San Carlos Apache Tribe); Fergus MacKay,
Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank’s Extractive
Industries Review, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 43 (2004); STAPP & BURNEY, supra note
144, at 133, 136-37 (stating Cemex, Inc. engaged in extensive cultural resource consultations with
thirteen tribes); Dean B. Suagee, Consulting with Tribes for Off-Reservation Projects, 25 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 54 (Summer 2010); Michael P. O’Connell, Indian Tribes and Project
Development Outside Indians Reservations, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 54, 55 (2007).
346. Performance Standard 7 Indigenous Peoples, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION
3, http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1ee7038049a79139b845faa8c6a8312a/PS7English2012
.pdf?MOD =AJPERES.
347. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, supra note 19, at 78-94, 115-172
348. See generally FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM
AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST (1975); DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN
INDIAN HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1971).
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federal policies and laws discussed above, and the attempts to improve
federal consultations with Indian nations, shows that federal officials and
policy makers are moving closer and closer to most of the FPIC provisions
explicated in the U.N. Declaration.
Second, and most significant to me, is that all but one of the six FPIC
provisions concern lands, assets, property rights, and human rights owned
and possessed by Indigenous peoples. In the context of United States
Indian law and policies, it is not surprising that Indian nations have wellrecognized property rights and sovereign powers to consent, or not, to
proposals that use, take, or significantly impact their rights.349 Even article
32(2) of the DRIP, which was so controversial in the WGDD drafting
process, and which WGDD Chairman Chávez unilaterally amended to
avoid an “Indigenous veto,”350 is solely about lands and resources owned by
Indigenous peoples. Consequently, the United States ought to support and
enforce this FPIC provision as well as the four other non-controversial
FPIC provisions.
A third reason for the United States to support at least five of the FPIC
provisions is the federal trust responsibility. This article has barely
mentioned this important topic, but it is very relevant when defining the
duties the United States owes Indian nations and peoples, which should
include consulting and acquiring their consent before taking or seriously
impacting their rights.351 According to the United States Supreme Court,
the United States,
[u]nder a humane and self imposed policy which has found
expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of
this Court, [ ] has charged itself with moral obligations of the
highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the
acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should
therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.352

349. See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions
About Natural Resource Extraction, 22 ARIZ. J INT’L & COMP. L. 17, 17 (2005) (“[W]here
property rights are affected . . . the international norm is developing to also require actual consent
by the indigenous peoples concerned.”).
350. See supra notes 331-37 and accompanying text. One reason article 32(2) was so
controversial, and why I argue it should be far less so in the United States, is that most of the lands
and resources claimed by Indigenous peoples worldwide are not as well identified as are Indian
and tribally owned lands in the United States. Many Indigenous communities have not yet had
their lands demarcated, thus there is tremendous concern in many countries about possible claims
to immense and, as of today, unknown lands and resources under article 32(2).
351. See, e.g., Routel & Holth, supra note 127, at 429-35; Mary Christina Wood, Indian
Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV.
1471; COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 412-36.
352. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (footnote omitted).
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The Congress and Executive Branch are well aware of their legal
responsibilities to tribal nations under this fiduciary duty and regularly
reference the trust responsibility in federal laws and regulations.353 It seems
obvious that the United States would be violating its trust duties if it
unilaterally takes the property and human rights of Indian nations and
peoples without consulting them first and without obtaining their consent.
Five of the six FPIC provisions seem to be implicated in the trust
obligations the United States possesses in regards American Indians and the
Indian nations.
Fourth, I see very practical reasons for the United States to deal with
Indian nations in this modern-day on an FPIC basis. It is far easier and less
expensive for the Congress and Executive Branch to fully and fairly consult
with tribal nations and to secure their consent before taking steps that
impact Indian rights. Tribal governments are more powerful and capable
today, and some are very well-funded now. In addition, they are very
effective at lobbying Congress and the public, and in hiring lobbyists and
attorneys to fight for their rights. Thus, perhaps even “selfish” pecuniary
and political interests—solid practical reasons—mandate that the United
States is better served by working with tribes on an FPIC basis and not by
unilateral actions.354
Finally, the sixth FPIC provision, article 19, seems to be another
matter. Article 20 of the WGIP Draft clearly recognized an Indigenous veto
power over states enacting legislative or administrative measures that
impacted Indigenous peoples. As detailed above, states vigorously fought
that idea, and the WGDD Chairman amended the provision that became
article 19 in the DRIP to negate any idea of an Indigenous veto in this
situation. The commentators uniformly agree that article 19 does not create
a veto power. They agree, though, that states must still consult with
Indigenous peoples and attempt to obtain consent on these matters. In a
democratic society, I believe that article 19 has to be read in that fashion.
In fact, no matter how article 19 might have ultimately been worded, the
DRIP itself states that all its provisions must be interpreted “in accordance
with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality,
non-discrimination, good governance and good faith.”355 Pursuant to an
353. See, e.g., id. at 296-97; COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 414.
354. President Fawn Sharp of the Quinault Nation stated: “good policy is so much more than
consultation . . . [the United States should embrace] free, prior and informed consent . . . [because
it] no longer has permission or power to make unilateral decisions about Indigenous resources and
lands.” Peter D’Errico, Opportunity Knocks in Senate: Experts Tiptoe, Native Leaders Respond,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, July 10 2011, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/07/
10/opportunity-knocks-us-senate-experts-tiptoe-native-leaders-respond.
355. G.A. Res. 61/295 (XLVI) (Sept. 13, 2007).
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interpretation that article 19 only guarantees Indigenous peoples the right to
participate in the democratic process, over the past six decades, American
Indian nations have become heavily involved and effective in the political
process of the United States; they are effective in working to ensure that
their rights and opinions are considered seriously and taken into account in
any legislative or administrative measures that might impact them.
In conclusion, the United States seems to have little reason to fear the
Declaration and seems to have had little legitimate reason to vote no in
2007. In line with its official statement of support for the Declaration in
2010, its trust responsibility, and its efforts of the past few decades in
regards to tribal consultations, the United States should improve its
consultation processes with Indian nations by not undertaking actions that
impact the property, human rights, and sovereign powers of Indian nations
and Indian peoples without their consent. The federal process of working
with Indian nations and peoples should not be a question of consultation or
consent, but should be a relationship based on consultation and consent.

